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 Article III(c) of the Colorado River Compact (Compact) establishes the shared 
obligations of the Upper and Lower Basins to deliver water to Mexico in fulfillment of the U.S.-
Mexico Treaty of 1944.
2
  It is generally regarded as the highest priority within the Law of the 
River apportionment scheme.
3
  However, several interpretive issues exist concerning the 
meaning of Article III(c), each of which pits the Upper and Lower Basins against one another 
with respect to their respective delivery obligations toward Mexico’s treaty entitlement to 
Colorado River water.  This document addresses four key issues regarding the Mexican 
apportionment: (1) tributaries issue (the treatment of Lower Basin tributaries under Article 
III(c)); (2) “surplus” issue (the definition of “surplus” waters within Article III(c)); (3) 
evaporation issue (the accounting of evaporation losses for purposes of Article III(c)); and (4) 
delivery issue (the timing of (and credit for) deliveries made pursuant to Article III(c)).  
 As is shown below, these are complex and interrelated issues, with the preponderance of 
the evidence seeming to favor each sub-basin’s position on two of the four issues.  Whether our 
                                                          
2
  Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Treaty Between the United States 
of America and Mexico (1944).  The treaty provisions fleshing out U.S. delivery obligations for Colorado River 
water include Art. 10 (establishing Mexico’s entitlement to 1.5 maf annually); Art. 11 (designating points of 
delivery for Mexico’s entitlement); Art. 15 (establishing delivery schedule for Mexico’s entitlement).  Interpretive 
issues exist concerning the meaning of some of these provisions – e.g., “extraordinary drought” clause in Art. 10 – 
but these issues (although interrelated) fall beyond the scope of the Art. III(c) issues covered in this document . 
 
3
  For commentary describing the Mexican treaty obligation as the highest priority within the Law of the River’s 
apportionment scheme, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al., The Law of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe 
Sustained Drought, 31 Water Resources Bull. 825, 826 (1995); John U. Carlson, The Colorado River Compact:  A 
Breeding Ground for International, National, and Interstate Controversies, Natural Resources Law Center, 
University of Colorado School of Law, June 5-7, 1989.  Provisions supporting this treatment of the Mexican treaty 
obligation include Colorado River Compact, Art. III(c) (requiring Upper and Lower Basins to make equal 
contributions to Mexican treaty obligation when surplus is not available); Colorado River Basin Project Act, § 202 
(declaring “the satisfaction of the requirements of the Mexican Water Treaty from the Colorado River constitutes a 
national obligation”); Colorado River Basin Project Act, § 602(a)(1) (designating satisfaction of Art. III(c) as first 
priority of releases of water from Lake Powell); Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River 
Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin Project Act of September 30, 1968, Art. III(1)(a) (designating 
Mexican Treaty obligations as first priority of releases of water from Lake Mead). 
3 
 
analysis would comport with any potential judicial ruling is, of course, speculative,
4
 but that is 
largely irrelevant to the point of our analysis, which is primarily to illustrate that fulfilling the 




 The tributaries issue can be stated succinctly:  Are the Lower Basin tributaries 
encompassed within the apportionment scheme established by the Compact – specifically, in 
relation to the Lower Basin’s obligation to deliver treaty water to Mexico under Article III(c)?
5
 
 Emboldened by the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1963) – which excluded the Lower Basin tributaries from the apportionment scheme assertedly 
established for that sub-basin in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) – the Lower Basin 
states allege that these tributaries likewise are excluded from the apportionment scheme set forth 
in the Compact, including in relation to determining whether “surplus” water exists to satisfy the 
Mexican delivery obligation under Article III(c).  The Upper Basin states contend to the 
contrary, noting the inapplicability of the holding in Arizona v. California (1963) to any 
interpretation of the Compact (i.e., as opposed to interpretations of the BCPA), and pointing to 
an array of textual and historical material supporting inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries for 
                                                          
4
 It is worth noting that the analytical methodology used in this document  mirrors the analytical approach of the 
United States Supreme Court when engaged in statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546 (1963) (demonstrating Supreme Court’s reliance on text, statutory context, and legislative history when 
interpreting provisions of Boulder Canyon Project Act). 
 
5
  The inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries within the Compact’s apportionment scheme also implicates the 
scope of the Upper and Lower Basin entitlements set forth in Articles III(a) and (b).  The Lower Basin’s entitlement 
to water from the “Colorado River System” would be considerably larger if this term were interpreted to afford the 
Lower Basin use of 8.5 maf per year from the mainstem alone. 
4 
 
purposes of determining the sub-basins’ Article III(c) delivery obligations.
6
 
 The evidence appears virtually overwhelming that the Lower Basin tributaries fall within 
the scope of the Compact’s apportionment scheme relevant to that sub-basin’s Mexican delivery 
obligation under Article III(c).  Support for this view comes from the material canvassed in the 
four sections below – i.e., (1) the text of Article III(c) and related provisions incorporated 
therein; (2) the provisions comprising the statutory context surrounding Article III(c); (3) the 
Negotiation Minutes addressing Article III(c) and inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries within 
the Compact’s apportionment scheme; and (4) the occurrence of several post-negotiation events 
involving acknowledgements by the Lower Basin that Article III(c) extends to the tributaries and 
revealing the Supreme Court’s seemingly affirmative view on this issue. 
 
Article III(c)’s Text 
 The text of Article III(c)  appears plain in its treatment of the Lower Basin tributaries: 
 “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall hereafter  
 recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the  
 Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters which 
 are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs 
 (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the 
 burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower 
 Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall deliver at  
 Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency recognized in addition to 
 that provided in paragraph (d).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 The waters to which the Mexican delivery obligation expressly attaches per this provision 
– i.e., the waters in which Mexico’s right to use vests and from which that right is to be 
                                                          
6
  For useful scholarship identifying the tributary issue and the sub-basins’ positions, see Carlson, Breeding Ground, 
supra note 3, at 15-16; John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An 
Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 21-1, 21.05[2][a] 
(1986); David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 424-25 (1985); 
Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West:  The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the American 
West 196-204, 258, 292 (2d ed 2009); Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1966). 
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“supplied” – are the waters of the “Colorado River System.”  The inclusion of the Lower Basin 
tributaries within the definition of this term in Article II(a) is as plain as the text of Article III(c): 
 “The term ‘Colorado River System’ means that portion of the Colorado River and its 
 tributaries within the United States of America.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 In addition to its express usage at the beginning of Article III(c), this definition also is 
incorporated into the provision via the phrase “the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b),” 
which refers to Articles III(a) and (b).  The quantities “specified” in these provisions expressly 
refer to “Colorado River System” water – specifically, 16.0 maf per year of it: 
 “(a) There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity to 
the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin, respectively, the exclusive beneficial 
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum . . . . 
 
(b) In addition to the apportionment in paragraph (a), the Lower Basin is hereby  
given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use of such waters by one 
million acre-feet per annum.”  (Emphasis added.) 
In accordance with this phrase, Article III(c) mandates that the “Colorado River System” water 
to which Mexico’s right to use attaches (as noted above) initially must be supplied from any 
“surplus” that might exist over and above the 16.0 maf of “Colorado River System” water 
apportioned in Articles III(a) and (b).  In short, any such “surplus” consists of “Colorado River 
System” water in the same manner as do the quantities specified in Articles III(a) and (b).  
   A final bit of textual indicia comes from the use of the terms “Upper Basin” and “Lower 
Basin” in Article III(c) – both of which also incorporate the “Colorado River System” definition.  
As defined in Articles II(f) and (g), these terms demarcate the geographic areas that (pursuant to 
Article III(c)) must equally bear the obligation of delivering “Colorado River System” water to 
Mexico if an inadequate surplus of such water exists (i.e., in “deficiency” conditions): 
 “(f) The term ‘Upper Basin’ means those parts of the States of Arizona, Colorado, 
 Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain into 
 the Colorado River System above Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said states located 
6 
 
 without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall  
 hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System above Lee Ferry.” 
 “(g) The term ‘Lower Basin’ means those parts of the States of Arizona, California, 
 Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain into the 
 Colorado River System below Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said States located 
 without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall 
 hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System below Lee Ferry.” 
 (Emphasis added.)   
These definitions expressly encompass the tributaries of both the Upper and Lower Basins. 
 Taken together, the clear inclusion of tributaries within the definition of “Colorado River 
System” in Article II(a), and the pervasive use of that term throughout Article III(c) and the 
provisions incorporated therein (Articles II(f), (g); Articles III(a), (b)), constitutes compelling 
(arguably determinative) evidence that the Compact Commissioners (Commissioners) intended 
the Lower Basin tributaries to be encompassed within the apportionment scheme relevant to that 
sub-basin’s Article III(c) delivery obligations in both “surplus” and “deficiency” conditions. 
 
Contextual Provisions 
 A host of provisions surrounding Article III(c) provide further support for inclusion of 
the Lower Basin tributaries vis-à-vis that sub-basin’s obligation to deliver Mexican treaty water.  
At least two strands of these provisions are relevant:  (1) provisions evidencing the intent of the 
Commissioners to establish an inclusive, basinwide apportionment scheme, and (2) provisions 
demonstrating the ability of the Commissioners to distinguish between the terms “Colorado 
River” and “Colorado River System” in their drafting of the Compact. 
 
Inclusive, Basinwide Apportionment Scheme 
 First and foremost among this strand of contextual provisions is Article I: 
7 
 
“The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and 
apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System; to establish the 
relative importance of different beneficial uses of water; to promote interstate comity; 
to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the expeditious 
agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of 
its waters, and the protection of life and property from floods.  To these ends the  
Colorado River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an apportionment of the use of 
part of the water of the Colorado River System is made to each of them with the 
provision that further equitable apportionments may be made.” 
 This statement of purposes in Article I serves as a guide to the intent of the 
Commissioners with regard to the whole document.  A statement made by Delph Carpenter, the 
Colorado Commissioner, during the Compact Negotiations attests to this point: 
 “MR. CALDWELL:  With those same arguments may we not cut out the article on 
purposes. 
 
 “MR. HOOVER:  I feel the article on “Purposes” has a clear p[s]ychological value. 
 
 “MR. CARPENTER:  They have a psychological value, and those articles, as drawn, may 
be later revised and improved, and if there is any question as to what the intent of the drafters of 
the compact was, they will turn to the article on ‘purposes’ to try to find a guide to that intent, -- 
I think there is great danger in leaving that out.  It is not alone a preamble, -- it is, if I may so 
term it, a declaration of principles.  It is a guide to the intent of the framers, and as such it must 




 With this perspective in mind, two aspects of Article I are notable for the light they shed 
on the intent of the Commissioners with regard to the Lower Basin tributaries in Article III(c).   
 First, Article I reflects the intent of the Commissioners to craft the apportionment scheme 
to encompass the entire “Colorado River System” – i.e., both tributaries and mainstem.
8
  The 
first and last clauses of the statement of purposes are indicative of this intent – both of which 
incorporate the definition of “Colorado River System” in Article II(a).  The first stated purpose 
                                                          
7
  Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 167.  Please 
note:  All citations to the Minutes of the Compact Negotiations refer to the pagination of the electronic copy of the 
Minutes available at http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/MinutesColoradoRiverCompact.pdf. 
 
8
  See Getches, supra note 6, at 425 (“Article I of the Compact says that the purpose of the Compact was ‘to provide 
for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the Colorado River System,’ indicating that the Gila’s 
waters should be included in the apportionment.”) 
8 
 
of the Compact is “to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the 
waters of the Colorado River System[,]” and “an apportionment of the use of part of the water of 
the Colorado River System” is made to the Upper and Lower Basins to this end.
9
  Also relevant 
is the fifth stated purpose:  “to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial development of 
the Colorado River Basin [and] the storage of its waters.”  Article II(b) defines “Colorado River 
Basin” as “all of the drainage area of the Colorado River System and all other territory within the 
United States of America to which the waters of the Colorado River System shall be beneficially 
applied.”  An inclusive, basinwide apportionment scheme is envisioned in all of these instances. 
 Second, given the inclusive, basinwide orientation of the apportionment scheme as 
reflected in Article I (and elsewhere), it is fair to expect any deviation from this orientation (e.g., 
a provision excluding the Lower Basin tributaries) to be set forth in clear, unequivocal language.  
Nothing of the sort exists in Article III(c).  Rather, as discussed above, the text of that provision 
offers arguably controlling evidence of an intent to encompass the Lower Basin tributaries within 
the apportionment scheme relevant to the sub-basins’ delivery obligations to Mexico. 
 In addition to Article I, Article III contains several contextual provisions that offer further 
support for the two points just noted – i.e., (1) the Compact’s apportionment scheme is inclusive 
and basinwide in its orientation and (2) any deviation from this orientation like exclusion of the 
Lower Basin tributaries presumably would appear explicitly.  Articles III(a) and (b) are both 
relevant in this regard.  As identified in the text above, the sub-basin entitlements set forth in 
these provisions attach to the waters of the “Colorado River System” as defined in Article II(a).  
Article III(a) expressly includes this definition, and Article III(b) incorporates it by reference to 
                                                          
9
  The inclusion of “Colorado River System” in the definitions of “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin” (excerpted 
above) is worth reiterating here as further evidence of the inclusive, basinwide nature of the apportionment scheme.  
On a separate note, the use of the term “part” in the last clause of Article I reflects the Commissioners’ perspective 
that more than the 16.0 maf of water apportioned in Articles III(a), (b), and (c) exists in the Colorado River System 
and that this unapportioned water would be subject to future equitable apportionments per Articles III(f) and (g).  
9 
 
“such waters.”  Articles III(f) and (g) are similar in nature.  Stemming from the Commissioners’ 
perceptions that more than the 16.0 maf of water apportioned in Articles III(a), (b), and (c) 
generally exists in the Colorado River System, Articles III(f) and (g) contemplate the future 
equitable apportionment of the initially unapportioned uses of this water.
10
 
 “(f) Further equitable apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the 
 Colorado River System unapportioned by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be made 
 in the manner provided in paragraph (g) at any time after October first, 1963, if 
 and when either Basin shall have reached its total beneficial consumptive use as 
 set out in paragraphs (a) and (b). 
 
 “(g) In the event of a desire for a further apportionment as provided in paragraph (f) 
 any two signatory States, acting through their Governors, may give joint notice of  
 such desire to the Governors of the other signatory States and to The President of the 
 United States of America, and it shall be the duty of the Governors of the signatory 
 States and of The President of the United States of America forthwith to appoint 
 Representatives, whose duty it shall be to divide and apportion equitably between the 
 Upper Basin and Lower Basin the beneficial use of the unapportioned water of the 
 Colorado River System as mentioned in paragraph (f) . . . .”  (Emphasis added.) 
 In sum, all four of these provisions within Article III unambiguously identify the 
“Colorado River System” as the subject of the Compact’s apportionment scheme, both in its 
current (Articles III(a) and (b)) and potentially future (Articles III(f) and (g)) forms.  Viewed 
against this backdrop, no aspect of Article III(c) suggests an intention to exclude the Lower 
Basin tributaries from the apportionment scheme relevant to the Mexican delivery obligation. 
 A final bit of support in this vein comes from Article VIII, which provides, in part: 
 “Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System 
 are unimpaired by this compact. . . .  All other rights to beneficial use of waters of the 
 Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from the water apportioned to that 
 Basin in which they are situate.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Like above, Article VIII evidences the intent of the Commissioners to establish an inclusive, 
                                                          
10
  Article VI also evidences the Commissioners’ perceptions that more than the 16.0 maf apportioned in Articles 
III(a), (b), and (c) exists in the Colorado River System.  Among other things, Article VI establishes dispute 
resolution procedures for potential claims or controversies between the basin states “with respect to the waters of the 
Colorado River System not covered by the terms of this compact.” 
10 
 
basinwide apportionment scheme, which is reflected in the provision’s designation of the 
“Colorado River System” as the source of water from which present perfected rights and other 
water rights will be satisfied within each sub-basin.  The text of Article III(c) bolsters this 




“Colorado River” versus “Colorado River System” 
 A related strand of contextual provisions consists of those demonstrating the ability of the 
Commissioners to distinguish between the “Colorado River” (i.e., mainstem) and the “Colorado 
River System” (i.e., mainstem and tributaries) in their drafting of the Compact.
12
  Five provisions 
illustrate this point:  (1) Article II(a) (differentiating “Colorado River” and its “tributaries” in 
definition of “Colorado River System”); (2) Article II(e) (referencing “mainstream of the 
Colorado River” in definition of “Lee Ferry”); (3) Article IV(b) (referencing “Colorado River” in 
relation to relative priorities of navigation, domestic, agricultural, and power uses); (4) Article 
V(b) (mandating cooperation for “ascertainment and publication of the annual flow of the 
Colorado River at Lee Ferry”); and (5) Article VIII (addressing storage capacity “on the main 
Colorado River” relevant to satisfaction of present perfected rights in Lower Basin).  Notably, 
some of these provisions appear adjacent to provisions where “Colorado River System” is used – 
e.g., Article IV(a) (“Colorado River”) and Article IV(b) (“Colorado River System”). 
 The implication of these provisions is straightforward:  The Commissioners’ purposeful 
use of “Colorado River” (and the like) throughout the Compact demonstrates that they were 
                                                          
11
  Article IV(b) also reveals the inclusive, basinwide orientation of the Compact’s apportionment scheme, 
establishing a hierarchy applicable to the “water of the Colorado River System” whereby hydropower generation is 
subservient to agricultural and domestic uses.  Moreover, as discussed below, the use of “Colorado River System” in 
Article IV(b) is significant based upon its contrast with the use of “Colorado River” in Article IV(a). 
 
12
  The Report of Special Master Simon H. Rifkind in the Arizona v. California (1963) litigation noted the ability of 
the Commissioners to use the terms “Colorado River System” and “Colorado River” purposefully to reflect their 
intended meaning.  See page 143 of the Report, which is published at 364 U.S. 940 (1961). 
11 
 
capable of using that term to designate the mainstem as the source of water from which the 
Mexican delivery obligation would be supplied in Article III(c) (i.e., as opposed to the “Colorado 
River System”) if they indeed had intended to do so.  Although this point is significant standing 
alone, it is worth considering in relation to the material in the previous subsection.  The 
provisions discussed there (including those in Article III) reflect an intention for the 
apportionment scheme to be inclusive and basinwide in scope.  It is fair to expect any exclusion 
for the Lower Basin tributaries in Article III(c) to be unambiguous given this backdrop.  Not 
only does Article III(c) lack such an exclusion, however, it includes the term “Colorado River 
System” in a context demonstrating the ability of the Commissioners to distinguish this term 
from “Colorado River” (and the like) to suit their purposes.  Coupled with the text of Article 
III(c), these contextual provisions appear to significantly undermine the Lower Basin position. 
 
Negotiation Minutes 
 Yet another source to consult in determining the Compact Commissioners’ intent with 
regard to the Lower Basin tributaries under Article III(c) is the Negotiation Minutes.
13
  The 
(voluminous) material below tracks relevant portions of the Negotiations from the First to the 
Twenty-Seventh Meetings.  Much of it reads like a drafting history accounting for the emergence 
of predecessors to Article III(c) and the evolution of that provision (and its incorporated 
definitions) after its introduction at the Twenty-Second Meeting in a form mirroring the final 
version.  Overall, the Negotiation Minutes bolster the conclusion supported by the text and 
context sections:  The Lower Basin tributaries fall within the Compact’s apportionment scheme 
relevant to that sub-basin’s delivery obligations to Mexico under Article III(c). 
                                                          
13
  For useful discussions of relevant excerpts from the Negotiation Minutes and related documents, see Carlson & 
Boles, supra note 6, at 21.05[2][a]; Hundley, supra note 6, at 196-204. 
12 
 
 Although far from dispositive of the tributaries issue, the opening statement of Herbert 
Hoover, the Federal Commissioner, at the First Meeting provides an engaging entry point into 
the Negotiations relevant to the intended meaning of Article III(c).  Foreshadowing the inclusive, 
basinwide orientation of the apportionment scheme eventually adopted in the final version of the 
Compact, Hoover described the purpose of the Commission as follows: 
  “This Commission has been established primarily to consider and if possible 
 to agree upon a compact between the seven states of the Colorado Basin, providing 
 for an equitable division of the water supply of the Colorado River and its tributaries  
 amongst the seven states.”
14
 
The tributaries thus fell squarely within the Commission’s charge in Hoover’s (early) estimation.  
And he was not alone in this view:  W.S. Norviel, the Arizona Commissioner, offered a proposal 
at the First Meeting outlining (among other things) the purpose, jurisdiction, and “principles and 
policies” of the Commission.  The provisions addressing these (and related) matters were replete 
with references to the “Colorado River and its tributaries”: 
  “WHEREAS, the purpose of the organization of the Colorado River 
 Commission is to determine the relative rights of the said states and of the United 
 States, and the citizens thereof, in and to Colorado River and its tributaries and to 
 the use and the benefits derived from the utilization of the waters thereof; to establish 
 and fix a policy and regulations to govern the further development of the river. 
 
  “THEREFORE, this Commission assumes jurisdiction over said Colorado 
 River and its tributaries, and the waters thereof for the above purposes, and shall  
 retain full jurisdiction and authority over the same during the life of this Commission. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
  “Therefore, being fully advised, the Commission makes, agrees to and 
 promulgates the following principles and policies with respect to the use of the 
 waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries: 
 
 * * * * * 
 
  “4.  That reciprocal arrangements or agreements shall be made and entered into 
 between any of the said states, or any of the citizens thereof, where the diversion of 
                                                          
14
  Minutes of the First Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, January 26, 1922, at 2 (emphasis added). 
13 
 
 the water from Colorado River or any of its tributaries may be more advantageously 
 made in one state for use in another state, and no request for such a permit shall be 
 denied without just cause.  Failing to reach an agreement, or the denial of the application 
 in such case, the matter shall be submitted to this Commission on an agreed statement 
 of facts for adjustment, as to an arbitrator, and the decision of this Commission shall be 
 final in such matters and respected by the officers in said states. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
  “7.  No water shall be diverted from Colorado River or any of its tributaries 
 for use outside the Colorado River Basin, except by unanimous consent of the 
 Commission. 
 
  “8.  As soon as practicable each member of this Commission shall collect 
 information showing all of the uses of the water from Colorado River and its  
 tributaries . . . .”
15
  
 Four days after submitting this initial proposal, at the Seventh Meeting of the 
Commission, Norviel presented a new proposal entailing different treatment of the Lower Basin 
tributaries.  Specifically, the proposal imposed limitations on the amounts of acreage eligible for 
development from Colorado River water in the basin states, but exempted the Gila River from 
these limitations, stating:  “[E]ach state shall be free to develop by reclamation – new lands up to 
the following acreages from Colorado River waters, excepting the Gila River . . . .”
16
 
 Mirroring his first proposal (and contrasting the preceding one), a draft compact 
submitted by Norviel at the Eleventh Meeting entitled, “Compact Providing for the Equitable 
Distribution of the Waters of Colorado River and Its Tributaries,”
17
 omitted any exception for the 
Gila River or other Lower Basin tributaries.  The draft compact noted the appointment of the 
Commission “to negotiate and enter into a Compact respecting the future utilization and 
                                                          
15
  Minutes of the First Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, January 26, 1922, at 49-54 (emphasis added). 
 
16
  Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, January 30, 1922, at 127, 134. 
 
17
  Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 11, 1922, at 12.  
14 
 
disposition of the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries . . . .”
18
  It likewise 
encompassed the tributaries (basinwide) within its statement of general principles and its 
corresponding definition of “Colorado River” in Article I: 
  “The States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, 
 and Wyoming mutually agree among themselves and with each other and with the 
 United States of America that with respect to the use, distribution and utilization of 
 the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries, where such use and distribution 
 within any state may affect the use and distribution made within another state, the 
 following general principles shall be recognized and enforced as controlling in all 
 interstate controversies or disputes relating thereto . . . . 
 
 * * * * * 
 
  “[First] For the purposes of this compact and when used herein Colorado 
 River shall be understood to include main stream and all tributaries of that river[.]”
19
 
Having set forth this definition, Norviel’s draft compact integrated it into a host of provisions 
addressing the appropriation of water from the “Colorado River” – e.g., provisions governing 
agricultural use; beneficial use; and use limitations (including use preferences).
20
 
 The draft compact submitted by Norviel was only one of four such documents presented 
at the Eleventh Meeting.
21
  The most notable of these additional submissions came from Delph 
Carpenter.  Carpenter’s draft compact was entitled, “Compact or Agreement for the Equitable 
Apportionment of the Water Supply of the Colorado River and of the Streams Tributary 
                                                          
18
  Id. (emphasis added).  
 
19
  Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  The definition of “Colorado River Basin” provided in this Article also is notable:  
“For the purpose of this compact, the Colorado River Basin is to be regarded as embracing the entire watershed of 
the Colorado River within the United States and also the Imperial and Coachella Valleys . . . .”  Id. 
 
20
 Id. at 13-14.  The draft compact (like Norviel’s proposal at the First Meeting) also called for the establishment of 
an ongoing Colorado River Commission.  It integrated the “Colorado River” definition into its description of the 
Commission’s powers:  “Said Commission shall be empowered and directed to make a study of all subjects that 
relate to the conservation and utilization of the waters of the Colorado River for beneficial uses . . . .”  Id. at 16. 
 
21
  The two additional draft compacts were from R.E. Caldwell, the Utah Commissioner, and Mr. George L. 





  Closely resembling the final version of the Compact, this draft addressed the 
tributaries in multiple provisions analogous to those surveyed above in the text and context 
sections.  These provisions included (1) the statement of purposes (“the equitable distribution 
and apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries”);
23
 (2) Article I 
(demarcating “[t]he territory included within the drainage area of the Colorado River and its 
tributaries and all lands now and hereafter watered from said stream” into Upper and Lower 
Divisions “for the purposes of the equitable apportionment and distribution of the uses and 
benefits of the waters of said river”);
24
 (3) Article II (establishing apportionment scheme for 
“[t]he waters of the Colorado River and of all the streams contributing thereto”);
25
 and (4) 
Articles VII and VIII (prescribing use preferences for waters of “stream and its tributaries”).
26
 
 In addition to these provisions, Articles III and VI of Carpenter’s draft compact expressly 
addressed the Lower Basin tributaries vis-à-vis that sub-basin’s delivery obligations to Mexico: 
  “[Article III:]  The High Contracting Parties agree that the duty and burden 
 of supplying any waters from the flow of the Colorado River within the United  
 States of America to the Republic of Mexico . . . shall be equally apportioned between 
 and equally borne by the Upper Division and the Lower Division of the Colorado 
 River within the United States of America; that the annual delivery at Lee’s Ferry, 
 by the States of the Upper Division, of a quantity of water equivalent to one-half the 
 annual amount required to satisfy any such international obligations shall be a 
 complete fulfillment of the provisions of this Article by said States; and that the 
 States of the Lower Division shall contribute annually a like amount of water from 
 those waters of the river annually to pass Lee’s Ferry for the Lower Division, as 
 provided in Paragraph two (2) of Article II of this compact, and from the flow of 
 tributaries entering the river below Lee’s Ferry, and further, shall cause the 
 water contributed by both divisions to be delivered to the Republic of Mexico 
                                                          
22
  Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 
23
  Id. (emphasis added) 
 
24
  Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  The tributaries also were expressly encompassed within the “Upper Division” and the 
“Lower Division” as those terms were defined in Article I of the draft.  Id. 
 
25
  Id. at 23. 
 
26
  Id. at 24-25. 
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 in conformity with any such treaty obligations. 
  “[Article VI:]  The High Contracting Parties agree that, subject at all times 
 to the rights to the diversion, use, and consumption of the waters of the Colorado 
 River and its tributaries for the benefit of the Upper Division but within the  
 limitations defined by this compact, and subject to the fulfillment of the obligations 
 expressed in Article III . . . each of the States whose territory is in part included 
 within the Lower Division shall have, possess, and enjoy under the constitution and 
 laws of each said State, and [within] its territory, the free and unrestricted uses and 
 benefits of the waters of those tributaries which enter the Colorado River below 
 Lee’s Ferry and of all waters of said river which may pass said point from the Upper 
 Division in conformity with . . . Article III of this compact.”
27
 
The text of these Articles plainly encompassed the tributaries of the Lower Basin (“Lower 
Division”) relevant to the delivery obligations of that entity to Mexico. 
 Between the submission of Carpenter’s draft proposal at the Eleventh Meeting and the 
oft-cited exchange over the Lower Basin tributaries at the Nineteenth Meeting (see below), the 
Commissioners discussed this subject in two relevant contexts.  First, at the Twelfth and 
Sixteenth Meetings, the Commissioners engaged in prolonged discussions of the relationship 
between evaporation losses and tributary inflows in the Lower Basin, as this relationship bears 
on the fairness of the Upper Basin’s annual delivery obligations to the Lower Basin and to 
Mexico.
28
  Second, at the Seventeenth Meeting, the Commissioners considered the Upper 
Basin’s annual delivery obligations at greater length, with the representatives of the Upper Basin 
states emphasizing how the Lower Basin states would be entitled to use the water afforded by 
these annual deliveries plus the water from the Lower Basin tributaries.
29
 
 It was at the Nineteenth Meeting, more so than at any other point in the Negotiations, that 
the status of the Lower Basin tributaries within the Compact’s apportionment scheme (relevant 
                                                          
27
  Id. at 24, 26 (emphasis added). 
 
28
  Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 12, 1922, at 79, 81, 85-88, 91-92; 
Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 14, 1922, at 74-84.  
 
29
  Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 15, 1922, at 93-100. 
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to the Mexican delivery obligation and otherwise) arose as an issue.  Hoover began the meeting 
by soliciting discussion about a draft of Article III(a) he had prepared addressing (among other 
things) the entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins.  The Article provided, in part: 
  “The water of the Colorado River System may be appropriated throughout 
 The Colorado River Basin without restriction until appropriations in either the 
 Upper Basin or the Lower Basin shall reach 7,500,000 acre feet per annum 
 including present initiated rights. . . .”
30
 
The status of the Lower Basin tributaries in relation to these entitlements boiled over as an issue 
when Hoover asked Norviel for his view on the Article.  A tense exchange followed involving 
Norviel, Carpenter, and Judge Stephen B. Davis, the New Mexico Commissioner: 
 “CHAIRMAN HOOVER:  What do you think, Mr. Norviel? 
 
 “MR. NORVIEL:  Well, the thing don’t mean much to me.  I don’t understand it at all. 
 
 “CHAIRMAN HOOVER:  How would you express it, Mr. Norviel, to comprise your 
idea? 
 
 “MR. NORVIEL:  I would want to know what we are driving at first.  I want to know 
where the water is to be divided, what the 7,500,000 acre feet per annum mean, and the reason 
for the 7,500,000 acre feet and if the 7,500,000 acre feet is to include the streams below Lee 
Ferry, and things of that kind.  Yesterday we arrived at the point of excluding those.  Mr. 
Carpenter made that statement that they were ours utterly to use as we saw fit in addition. – 
 
 “MR. CARPENTER:  (Interrupting) No I didn’t, not for a minute. 
 
 “MR. NORVIEL:  I will get the record. 
 
 “MR. DAVIS:  Irrespective of what Mr. Carpenter said, I think it is incorrect to say we 
have arrived at any point, -- if you mean by that All the northern states, because we have arrived 
at nothing. 
 
 “MR. NORVIEL:  Then we will have to start all over.”
31
 
 To navigate this impasse, Hoover proceeded to read through the terms of the draft of 
Article III, inquiring about, and receiving confirmation of, Norviel’s understanding of those 
                                                          
30
  Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 2.   
 
31
  Id. at 3-4. 
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terms.  During this exchange, Norviel acknowledged the inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries 
within the apportionment scheme set forth in the Article – specifically, in relation to the terms 
“water of the Colorado River System” and “Colorado River Basin” as used therein. 
  “CHAIRMAN HOOVER:  It doesn’t seem to me we make progress on this work, 
which is very important work, if we have to go back to where we all started from, because we 
have all revolved in so many circles and out again. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Let it be stated then in here just exactly what it means.  I can’t 
understand what it means. 
 
  “CHAIRMAN HOOVER:  Let’s go through it and see if we can understand it.  
‘The water of the Colorado River System,’ which includes the whole drainage basin of the 
Colorado River in the United States under our definition, and includes the Gila and all the other 
lower rivers, ‘may be appropriated throughout the Colorado River Basin,’ which includes the 
whole area, -- ‘without restriction until appropriations in either the Upper Basin or the Lower 
Basin shall reach 7,500,000 acre feet per annum including the present initiated rights.’  Is that 
clear Mr. Norviel? 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  If that means all of the drainage in the Basin, old and new, -- if 
that is what is means then I understand it up to that point. 
 
  “CHAIRMAN HOOVER:  Well, it means everything in the Basin.  We have got a 
definition here of the exact meaning of those Basins, it includes everything. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  All right.”
32
 
 At the Twentieth Meeting, which was held later the same day in which the exchanges 
above took place, the Commissioners adopted a draft of the inclusive, basinwide definition of 
“Colorado River System” that eventually appeared in the final version of the Compact:  “that 
portion of the Colorado River and all of its tributaries within the United States.”
33
 Also at this 
meeting, the Commissioners adopted definitions of “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin” – again, 
both in draft form – that incorporated the definition of “Colorado River System” in defining the 
                                                          
32
  Id. at 4-5.  Norviel later explained the reason for his misunderstanding about the exclusion of the Lower Basin 
tributaries from the draft apportionment scheme.  See id. at 9-10. 
 
33
  Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 85. 
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scope of these areas and that eventually appeared in the final version of the Compact.
34
  The draft 
of Article III, however, was held in suspension as of the end of this meeting.
35
 
 The Commissioners subsequently revisited Article III at the Twenty-First Meeting – in 
what proved to be a definitive way – initially discussing a revised apportionment scheme 
proposed by Norviel that accounted for the Lower Basin tributaries, and later considering four 
methods of apportionment prepared by James G. Scrugham, the Nevada Commissioner, none of 
which excluded the tributaries.  After briefly surveying Scrugham’s four approaches, the 
Commissioners agreed to refer them (i.e., Article III) to a drafting committee for consideration.
36
 
 A draft of Article III closely resembling the final version contained in the Compact 
emerged out of the drafting committee.  It was introduced at the Twenty-Second Meeting.  The 
Commissioners unanimously adopted the following version of Article III(c): 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of the waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall first be supplied from the surplus 
 water after the above amounts have been satisfied; and if such surplus shall prove 
 insufficient for this purpose, then the deficiency shall be equally apportioned between 
 and equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin and when necessary the 
 States of the upper division shall deliver at Lee Ferry one-half of the deficiency so 
 recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).”
37
 
The italicized text highlights two of the three operative sections of the final version of Article 
III(c) that are relevant to the tributaries issue.  As noted above, the Commissioners previously 
had adopted a draft definition of “Colorado River System” at the Twentieth Meeting that 
included the Lower Basin tributaries (“that portion of the Colorado River and all of its tributaries 
within the United States”) as well as draft definitions of “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin” that 
                                                          
34
  Id. at 85-87. 
 
35
  Id. at 90. 
36
  Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 20, 1922, at 127-33.  
37
  Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 138-39, 149. 
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incorporated “Colorado River System” in their demarcation of those geographic areas.
38
 
 Little changed with the draft of Article III(c) introduced at the Twenty-Second Meeting 
during the remainder of the Negotiations.  By the time they adjourned the Twenty-Fourth 
Meeting, the Commissioners had adopted the definitions of “Colorado River System,” “Upper 
Basin,” and “Lower Basin” incorporated into the final version of Article III(c) (and set forth in 
Article II).
39
  These terms have been identified and discussed above, but it is worth repeating that 
every one of them encompassed (i.e., encompasses) the Colorado River mainstem and its 
tributaries.  In turn, the Commissioners adopted the final version of Article III(c) at the Twenty-
Fifth Meeting, having modified the draft version introduced at the Twenty-Second Meeting in 
two ways (neither of which is relevant here).
40
  The Commissioners adopted Compact in its 





 Coupled with the relevant excerpts of the Negotiation Minutes, the textual and contextual 
material discussed above is the most probative evidence of the intended status of the Lower 
Basin tributaries under Article III(c) at the time of the Compact’s formation (i.e., from an 
originalist viewpoint).  That said, five post-Negotiation events are notable for the insight they 
provide into the oscillating position of the Lower Basin regarding the tributaries issue and the  
potential holding of the Supreme Court if it were faced with interpreting Article III(c) in this 
respect.  Brief accounts of these five events are presented in chronological order below. 
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  Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 85-87. 
 
39
  Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 23, 1922, at 238. 
 
40
  Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 23, 1922, at 255-56. 
 
41
  Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 24, 1922, at 305. 
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 An initial event of significance consists of statements made and actions taken by federal 
legislators – including Arizona Senator Carl Hayden – concerning the tributaries issue while the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) was pending in Congress.  These statements and actions 
evidence an understanding on the parts of these legislators that the Compact (whose approval 
hinged on passage of the BCPA) contemplated inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries in the 
apportionment scheme set forth in Article III.  Carlson & Boles offer a succinct account: 
 
 “Congress' intention in approving the Compact through the Boulder Canyon Project 
 Act was clearly to subject the Lower Basin tributaries to the demands of Article III.   
 Hoover ventured this interpretation of the Compact when responding to Congressman  
 Hayden's 26 written questions, which answers Hayden conspicuously introduced into 
 the Congressional Record.  During floor debate on the Project Act, Senator Johnson 
 remarked ‘in this compact the Colorado River basin embraces not alone the mainstream, 
 but embraces the tributaries of the mainstream as well.’  Senator Phipps indicated the 
 same understanding.  Senator Hayden twice offered amendments to the pending 
 legislation to exempt the Gila, except such return flow as might reach the mainstream, 
 from any obligation under the Mexican Treaty and to allow Arizona exclusive beneficial 
 use of the Gila within the state.  Both were defeated.”
42
 
 Occurring contemporaneously with the first event, and equally indicative of the Lower 
Basin’s viewpoint regarding the tributaries issue shortly after the Negotiations, were statements 
made and actions taken by Arizona politicians (and the responses of basin state and federal 
officials thereto) identifying how Arizona’s refusal to ratify the Compact was due to inclusion of 
the Lower Basin tributaries within the scope of Article III(c).  As described by Carlson & Boles: 
 “Arizona's past conduct with respect to this issue was such as to render its current 
 position not only untenable, but preposterous.  In the 1920's and 1930's, its view 
 that the Compact included all tributary waters for the purpose of determining an 
 Article III(c) surplus was open and notorious.  Governor Hunt inveighed against it 
 on precisely this ground.  At the Denver Governor's Conference, called by the Upper 
 Basin states in 1927 to try to settle the differences between California and Arizona,  
 Arizona accepted the Governors’ proposed compromise ‘but attached a condition to 
 the effect that the tributaries of Arizona must be released and relieved from the burden 
 which might hereafter be impressed upon them by virtue of any treaty[.]’   The governors  
                                                          
42




 declined the new proposition.  The secretary of Arizona's Colorado River Commission  
 divulged to the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation in 1928 that:  ‘it is the 
 . . . . justifiable fear of Arizona, that under the terms of the compact Arizona would be 
 called upon to supply out of her tributaries the burden of the allotment to Mexico.’  
 Senator Hayden advised the Senate:  ‘the primary reason why the Colorado River 
 compact was not approved by the State of Arizona was that the Gila River and its  
 tributaries were included in the Colorado River Basin.  The people of Arizona felt— 
 and justly so—that they had appropriated and put to beneficial use all of the waters of 
 that stream, and that by remaining out of the compact under no circumstances could  
 the waters of that stream be burdened with furnishing any water to Old Mexico, while  




 Although focused on Article III(b) rather than Article III(c), the second case brought by 
Arizona against California and the other basin states after the Compact and BCPA had become 
effective, Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934), constitutes a third post-Negotiation event 
of significance to the tributaries issue.
44
  In this case, Arizona sought to perpetuate testimony 
from several of the Commissioners to the effect that they had intended Article III(b)’s allocation 
of 1.0 maf per year to be for the exclusive benefit of Arizona in exchange for the inclusion of the 
Lower Basin tributaries within the Compact’s apportionment scheme.
45
  Arizona contended that 
Article III(b) was ambiguous in this respect and that the proposed testimony would resolve this 
ambiguity – specifically, as the alleged ambiguity related to the meaning of  § 4(a) of the BCPA 
and Arizona’s share of the Lower Basin’s Compact entitlement assertedly apportioned 
thereunder.
46
  Denying Arizona’s request, the Court held (among other things)
47
 that the meaning 
                                                          
43
  Id. at 35-36 (internal citations omitted).  See also Getches, supra note 6, at 425 (“One of Arizona’s reasons for its 
steadfast refusal to ratify the Colorado River Compact was uncertainty over its rights to water from the Gila.”); 
Hundley, supra note 6, at 258 (identifying acknowledgement of Arizona legislature during ratification proceedings 
that Compact’s apportionment scheme encompasses Lower Basin tributaries). 
 
44
  See Carlson & Boles, supra note 6, at 21.05[2][a] (noting significance of case to tributaries issue). 
 
45
  Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. at 348-350.  The Negotiation Minutes contain support for Arizona’s position on 
this issue.  See Hundley, supra note 6, at 292 (“The minutes . . . reveal that Article III(b) was added in response to 
Norviel’s protests concerning the lower-basin tributaries, especially the Gila. . . .”). 
46
  Id. at 352. 
 
47
  The Court also held that the meaning of Article III(b) was not relevant to the meaning of BCPA § 4(a) because 
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of Article III(b) was unambiguous, describing (1) Articles III(a) and (b) apportion water “from 
the Colorado River System, i.e., the Colorado and its tributaries” between the Upper and Lower 
Basins and (2) Article III(b) clearly expresses an intent to allocate an additional 1.0 maf per year 
of “such water” among all of the Lower Basin states, not to Arizona alone.
48
 
  At least two aspects of this decision are notable in relation to the tributaries issue.  First, 
Arizona acknowledged the inclusion of the Lower Basin tributaries within the Compact’s 
apportionment scheme – albeit in the context of Article III(b) rather than Article III(c), although 
the operative text of Article III(b) (“such waters” in relation to “Colorado River System” in 
Article III(a)) mirrors the operative text of Article III(c) (“Colorado River System”).  Second, the 
Supreme Court likewise recognized the inclusive, basinwide nature of the Compact’s 
apportionment scheme established by the definition of “Colorado River System,” again albeit as 
that term is used in Articles III(a) and (b) rather than in Article III(c).  Ultimately, both aspects of 
this case disfavor interpreting Article III(c) to exclude the Lower Basin tributaries, and also offer 
insight into how the Supreme Court might resolve the tributaries issue if it were presented. 
 To a similar effect is a fourth significant post-Negotiation event:  The issuance of the 
Report prepared by Special Master Simon H. Rifkind in conjunction with the seminal case 
between Arizona and California – Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
49
  Alongside other 
pivotal issues presented in this case was whether the BCPA apportioned the 8.5 maf per year 
entitlement secured for the Lower Basin in Articles III(a) and (b) of the Compact among 
Arizona, California, and Nevada – i.e., whether the BCPA established an apportionment scheme 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the latter provision did not purport to apportion the Lower Basin’s entitlement set forth in Articles III(a) and (b) of 
the Compact among the Lower Basin states (i.e., BCPA § 4(a) did not establish an apportionment scheme for the 
Lower Basin).  Id. at 357-58.  This holding stands in sharp contrast with the Court’s subsequent holding in Arizona 
v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (interpreting BCPA as establishing Lower Basin apportionment scheme). 
 
48
  Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. at 358.  
 
49
  Arizona v. California, 364 U.S. 940 (1961) (Report of Special Master Rifkind). 
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for the Lower Basin states.  The Special Master determined the Compact itself was irrelevant in 
resolving this issue due to the interbasin (rather than interstate) nature of Article III and related 
provisions.
50
  Nonetheless, “in view of the urgent arguments of the sovereign parties and against 
the eventuality that the Court may take a different view of the matter,”
51
 the Special Master 
offered his views regarding the meaning of various Compact provisions in dicta, including all of 
the subsections of Article III.  Expressly rejecting Arizona’s argument that the Compact’s 
apportionment “relates to the mainstream exclusively,” the Special Master determined the text of 
Article III(c) to be plain in encompassing both the mainstem and tributaries. 
  “The limits established by the Compact on the acquisition of appropriative 
 rights are applicable to the mainstream of the Colorado River and its tributaries. . . . 
 [T]he plain words of the Compact permit only one interpretation – that Article III 
 (a), (b), (c), (f), and (g) deal with both the mainstream and the tributaries.  Article 
 II(a) states:  ‘The term ‘Colorado River System’ means that portion of the Colorado 
 River and its tributaries within the United States of America.’  Article III(a) apportions 
 ‘from the Colorado River System . . . the exclusive beneficial consumptive use . . . of 
 water.’  Article III(b) allows the Lower Basin ‘to increase its beneficial consumptive 
 use of such waters. . . .’  ‘Such waters’ can only refer to System waters, that is, to 
 mainstream and tributary water as defined in Article II(a).  In Article III(c), (f) and 
 (g) System water is specified by name.  The various arguments of Arizona fail before 
 this unmistakable language of the Compact.”
52
 
 Constituting a fifth significant post-Negotiation event, the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decision in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), contains dicta resembling that quoted 
above from the Special Master’s Report.
53
  Resting its holding regarding the BCPA’s asserted 
establishment of a Lower Basin apportionment scheme on the Act alone (i.e., not on the 
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  Id. at 139-41. 
 
51
  Id. at 141. 
 
52
  Id. at 142-43 (emphasis added).  Notably, the Special Master recognized but declined to address competing views 
of the parties regarding certain aspects of Article III(c) – namely, “(1) what is the meaning of the word ‘surplus’? (2) 
If surplus is not sufficient to supply Mexico, how should the Upper Basin’s further delivery obligation be measured 
under the language of Article III(c)?”  Id. at 145. 
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 the Court avoided Arizona’s argument that the apportionment scheme in Article III 
encompasses only the Colorado River mainstem, providing the following insight into what the 
then-composed Court might have held if the tributaries issue had been presented: 
  “Arizona argues that the Compact apportions between basins only the waters 
 of the mainstream, not the mainstream and the tributaries.  We need not reach that 
 question, however, for we have concluded that whatever waters the Compact 
 apportioned the Project Act itself dealt only with water of the mainstream. . . .  
 Inclusion of the tributaries in the Compact was natural in view of the upper States’ 
 strong feeling that the Lower Basin tributaries should be made to share the burden 
 of any obligation to deliver water to Mexico that a future treaty might impose.”
55
 
This dicta is accompanied by similar statements from the Court: 
  “Arizona, because of her particularly strong interest in the Gila, intensely 
 resented the Compact's inclusion of the Colorado River tributaries in its allocation 
 scheme and was bitterly hostile to having Arizona tributaries, again particularly the 
 Gila, forced to contribute to the Mexican burden.  Largely for these reasons, Arizona 




  “California is in basic disagreement with almost all of the Master's Report. 
 She argues that the Project Act, like the Colorado River Compact, deals with the 




 Having arrived at the end of this section, the “disclaimer” offered at its outset is worth 
repeating:  The most probative evidence of the intent of the  Commissioners regarding the status 
of the Lower Basin tributaries under Article III(c) is the text and context of that provision 
coupled with the relevant excerpts from the Negotiation Minutes.  Nonetheless, the diverse post-
Negotiation events surveyed in this section bolster the conclusion strongly supported by those 
materials:  Article III(c) encompasses the Lower Basin tributaries.  The post-Negotiation events 
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  See Getches, supra note 6, at 425 (“The status of the Gila under the Compact has never been determined. . . .  
[Arizona v. California (1963)] dealt only with an allocation among Lower Basin states under the Act, and 
consequently whether the Gila is apportioned under the Colorado River Compact remains an open question.”)   
 
55
   Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 568-69 (1963) (emphasis added). 
 
56
  Id. at 558. 
 
57
  Id. at 563 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 557-58 (noting inclusive, basinwide definition of “Colorado River 
System” in Article II(a) and its incorporation in Articles III(a), (b), and (c)). 
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likewise suggest the Supreme Court would so hold if asked. 
 
Conclusion 
 To reiterate, the material covered above favors the view that the Lower Basin tributaries 
fall within the scope of the Compact’s apportionment scheme relevant to that sub-basin’s 
delivery obligations to Mexico under Article III(c).  It is possible (though perhaps unlikely) that 
the Supreme Court would consider the text of Article III(c) alone sufficiently plain and 
compelling to warrant such a holding.  If not, the contextual and historical materials offer  a wide 
range of additional support for this conclusion. 
 
“Surplus” Issue 
 At the heart of the “surplus” issue is the meaning of that term within Article III(c): 
 “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall hereafter  
 recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the  
 Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters which 
 are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs 
 (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the 
 burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower 
 Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall deliver at  
 Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency recognized in addition to 
 that provided in paragraph (d).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 The Upper and Lower Basins both recognize surplus water as the first source of supply 
for deliveries of water to Mexico under this provision – specifically, in relation to the 1.5 maf 
annual entitlement established for Mexico in the 1944 Treaty.
58
  The point of contention 
concerns what water constitutes “surplus” within the meaning of Article III(c).   
 The Upper Basin contends that “surplus” water consists of water over and above the 7.5 
                                                          
58
  The treaty provisions fleshing out the obligations of the United States to deliver Colorado River water to Mexico 
include Art. 10 (establishing Mexico’s entitlement to 1.5 maf annually); Art. 11 (designating points of delivery for 
Mexico’s entitlement); and Art. 15 (establishing delivery schedule for Mexico’s entitlement). 
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maf and 8.5 maf annual entitlements apportioned to the Upper and Lower Basins, respectively, in 
Articles III(a) and (b) of the Compact.
59
  According to the Upper Basin, if water use in the Lower 
Basin exceeds 8.5 maf in a given year – accounting for use on the mainstem and its tributaries – 
then the water used in excess of this annual entitlement constitutes “surplus.”  The Upper Basin 
asserts that its delivery obligations to Mexico are relieved to the extent that such surplus exists – 
e.g., if water use in the Lower Basin is 10.0 maf or greater in a given year, then the existence of 
the 1.5 maf of surplus water relieves the Upper Basin of any obligation to contribute water 
toward deliveries of Mexico’s (1.5 maf) treaty entitlement. 
 The Lower Basin disputes the notion that “surplus” water refers to water over and above 
the individual sub-basin entitlements allocated in Articles III(a) and (b).
60
  According to the 
Lower Basin, the aggregate quantity of water set forth in those entitlements, 16.0 maf, marks the 
baseline for determining whether “surplus” exists under Article III(c).  If the supply of water in 
                                                          
 
59
  For scholarship identifying the Upper Basin’s position, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Disappearing 
Colorado River 9 W. Econ. F. 1, 2-3 (2010); W. Patrick Schiffer et al., From a Colorado River Compact Challenge 
to the Next Era of Cooperation Among the Seven Basin States, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 217, 220-21 (2007); James S. 
Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from the Colorado River, Part I:  The Law 
of the River, 4 U. Denver Water L. Rev. 290, 320 (2001); John U. Carlson, The Colorado River Compact:  A 
Breeding Ground for International, National, and Interstate Controversies 19-20, Natural Resources Law Center, 
University of Colorado School of Law, June 5-7, 1989; John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Contrary Views of the 
Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. 
L. Inst. 21-1, 21.05[2][a] (1986); Edward W. Clyde, Institutional Response to Prolonged Drought, in New Courses 
for the Colorado River 116 (1986); Edward W. Clyde, Conflicts Between the Upper and Lower Basins on the 
Colorado River, in Resources Development:  Frontiers for Research 127-28 (1960).  A recent (albeit broadly stated) 
expression of the Upper Basin’s position can be found in Letter from Scott Balcomb et al., Governors’ 
Representatives on Colorado River Operations of the States of Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico & Utah to Herb 
Guenther et al., Governors’ Representatives of the States of Arizona, California, and Nevada (October 7, 2004) 
(“The fundamental issue for the Upper Basin relates to whether a deficiency exists under Article III(c) of the 
Compact, which would trigger an obligation of the Upper Basin to share in any such deficiency.  As you are aware, 
it has been our consistent position that because no such deficiency has been shown to exist, the Upper Basin has no 
obligation in this regard.”). 
 
60
  For scholarship identifying the Lower Basin’s position, see  MacDonnell, Disappearing Colorado River, supra 
note 59, at 3 n 12; Schiffer et al., supra note 59, at 221-22; Carlson, Breeding Ground, supra note 59, at 15; Carlson, 
Contrary Views, supra note 59, at 36-37; Clyde, Institutional Response, supra note 59, at 113; David H. Getches, 
Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 421-22 (1985); Charles J. Meyers, The 
Colorado River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1966).  Schiffer et al. provide the most thorough recent discussion of the 
Lower Basin’s position (i.e., from Arizona’s viewpoint).  Mr. Schiffer served as Chief Counsel for the Arizona 
Department of Water Resources at the time of the article’s publication. 
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the “Colorado River System”
61
 exceeds 16.0 maf in a given year, then the water over and above 
that amount constitutes “surplus” to be put toward Mexico’s treaty entitlement. 
 The Lower Basin’s position on this issue is compelling.  As used in Article III(c), 
“surplus” seems to refer to water in the Colorado River System over and above the 16.0 maf 
apportioned annually for use in the Upper and Lower Basins by Articles III(a) and (b).  This 
issue  appears almost as clear cut as the tributaries issue – in relation to which the Lower Basin’s 
argument that its tributaries are exempted from the Mexican delivery obligation contradicts the 
plain text of Article III(c) (i.e., the use of “Colorado River System” therein).  Overall, the vast 
majority of evidence supports the Lower Basin’s construction of “surplus,” including (1) the text 
of Article III(c) and provisions incorporated therein; (2) the provisions comprising the statutory 
context surrounding Article III(c); and (3) the Negotiation Minutes addressing this aspect of 
Article III(c).  The sections below survey relevant materials in each of these categories. 
 
Article III(c)’s Text 
 A useful way to structure a textual analysis of Article III(c) in relation to the surplus issue 
is to evaluate the text based on the two main sections in which it appears.  Article III(c) initially 
addresses the prospective establishment of a Mexican entitlement to Colorado River System 
water via treaty:  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the 
Colorado River System . . . .”  The provision then specifies in two sections how this water will 
be supplied to Mexico during (1) surplus conditions and (2) deficiency conditions. 
 Surplus Conditions (Section One):  “such waters shall be supplied first from the waters 
                                                          
 
61
  Article II(a) defines “Colorado River System” as “that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the 
United States of America.” 
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which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in [Articles 
III(a) and (b)]; . . .” 
 
 Deficiency Conditions (Section Two):  “if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this 
purpose, then the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin 
and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall 
deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency so recognized in addition 
to that provided in [Article III(d)].” 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The text of these two sections – especially, the use of the term “aggregate” in 
section one – provides strong support for the Lower Basin’s position that “surplus” refers to 
water in the Colorado River System over and above the 16.0 maf apportioned (in the aggregate) 
to the Upper and Lower Basins in Articles III(a) and (b). 
 Three phrases and terms in the first section of Article III(c) shed light on this issue:  (1) 
“quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b)”; (2) “aggregate”; and (3) “waters which are 
surplus over and above.”  The meanings of these phrases and terms are worth examining 
individually and then piecing together as they appear in Article III(c). 
 The phrase “quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b)” refers to the quantities 
associated with the sub-basin entitlements set forth in Articles III(a) and (b).  These quantities 
are expressed plainly:  Article III(a) entitles both the Upper and Lower Basins to the “exclusive 
beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum” from the Colorado River 
System, and Article III(b) authorizes the Lower Basin to increase its “beneficial consumptive use 
of such waters by one million acre-feet per annum.”   The respective quantities of the 
entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins are thus 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf annually. 
 Turning to “aggregate,” it is a term of common usage (i.e., not a legal term), and 
therefore it is appropriate to assess its meaning by referencing dictionaries that existed (roughly) 
contemporaneously with the drafting of the Compact.  Two notable definitions appear in these 
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contemporary dictionaries:  “sum total”
62
 and “sum of particulars.”
63
  It seems reasonable to treat 
“sum” as a synonym for “aggregate” in Article III(c) in light of these definitions – i.e., the 
“[sum] of the quantities specified in [Articles III(a) and (b)].” 
 A similar approach is appropriate for the phrase “waters which are surplus over and 
above.”  Definitions of “surplus” in contemporary dictionaries included:  (1) “[a]mount left over 
when requirements have been met”
64
 and (2) “[t]hat which remains when use or need is satisfied; 
excess; . . . [t]he remaining part.”
65
  Like above, reasonable synonyms for “surplus” in Article 
III(c) seem to be “excess” or “remaining” per these definitions – i.e., “waters which are [excess 
or remaining] over and above the [sum] of the quantities specified in [Articles III(a) and (b)].” 
 Piecing together the phrases and terms as construed above, the first section of Article 
III(c) provides that the Colorado River System waters to which Mexico is entitled “shall be 
supplied first from the waters which are [excess or remaining] over and above the [sum] of the 
quantities specified in [Articles III(a) and (b) – i.e., 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf].”  The “aggregate” of 
7.5 maf and 8.5 maf is unambiguous – 16.0 maf.  The text provides that this quantity – not the 
singular quantities associated with the sub-basins’ entitlements (7.5 maf; 8.5 maf) – defines the 
line above which “surplus” waters exist and must be used to supply water to Mexico.  The Upper 
Basin’s contrary view essentially ignores the role of “aggregate” in defining surplus conditions.
66
 
 The text of the second section of Article III(c) comports with this interpretation.  Nothing 
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  The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English 16 (1925). 
 
63
  Webster’s International Dictionary of the English Language 49 (2d ed. 1935). 
 
64
  The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English 842 (1925). 
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  Webster’s International Dictionary of the English Language 2,539 (2d ed. 1935). 
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  See, e.g., Carlson & Boles, supra note 59, at 21.05[2][a] (“[T]he Upper Basin’s position in this respect 
contravenes the express language of Article III(c), which provides that the Mexican treaty water ‘shall be supplied 




about this text suggests that “surplus” water refers to amounts of water by which the sub-basins 
are exceeding their individual entitlements in Articles III(a) and (b).  Specifically, the second 
section of Article III(c) comes into play if “such surplus” – i.e., Colorado River System water 
over and above the 16.0 maf apportioned in Articles III(a) and (b) – proves insufficient to supply 
Mexico’s treaty entitlement.  In this situation, the Upper and Lower Basins must equally bear the 
“deficiency” – which contemporary dictionaries define as “shortage” or “deficit”
67
 – and this 
obligation entails the Upper Division delivering at Lee Ferry one-half of the water associated 
with the deficiency plus the water required to comply with Article III(d).  No aspect of this text 
contradicts the conclusion compelled by the first section of Article III(c):  The aggregate 16.0 
maf allocated in Articles III(a) and (b) defines the baseline for surplus (or deficiency) conditions. 
 
Contextual Provisions 
 In addition to its text, two types of provisions surrounding Article III(c) shed further light 
on the meaning of “surplus” therein:  (1) provisions illustrating the ability of the Compact 
Commissioners (Commissioners) to reference the entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins in 
Articles III(a) and (b) individually rather than in the aggregate and (2) provisions emphasizing 
equity as the overarching norm around which the Compact’s apportionment scheme is framed 
and according to which “surplus” should be construed in Article III(c).
68
  
                                                          
 
67
  The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English 211 (1925) (“lack or shortage (of) . . . deficit”).  See also 
Webster’s International Dictionary of the English Language 687 (2d ed. 1935) (defining “deficiency” as the “state or 
quality of being deficient; inadequacy; defect”; defining “deficient” as “[l]acking in some quality, characteristic, or 
the like, necessary for completeness; . . . not up to a given or normal standard; not sufficient; defective; lacking; . . . 
also, needed to make up completeness; as, the amount deficient was easily made up”). 
68
  Various provisions surrounding Article III(c) reflect the Commissioners’ understanding that more than 16.0 maf 
per year of water exists within the Colorado River System – e.g., Article I (noting Compact’s apportionment scheme 
accounts for use of “part of the water of the Colorado River System”); Article III(f) (authorizing “[f]urther equitable 
apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the Colorado River System unapportioned by paragraphs (a), 





 At least two provisions – Articles III(b) and (f) – illustrate that the Commissioners were 
capable of referencing the individual entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins – i.e., rather 
than the “aggregate of the quantities” associated with those entitlements – when drafting sections 
of the Compact calling for such an approach.  The fact that the Commissioners did not use 
entitlement-specific references in Article III(c) weighs against the Upper Basin’s position. 
 Article III(f) authorizes an equitable apportionment beyond that initially established by 
the Compact if either sub-basin has begun using the full amount of its entitlement in Articles 
III(a) and (b) after October 1, 1963.  The text of Article III(f) provides: 
  “Further equitable apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the 
 Colorado River System unapportioned by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be made 
 in the manner provided in paragraph (g) at any time after October first, 1963, if and 
 when either Basin shall have reached its total beneficial consumptive use as set out 
 in paragraphs (a) and (b).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 As identified in the italicized text, Article III(f) includes an entitlement-specific reference 
to designate the triggering event for further equitable apportionment, which contrasts 
significantly with the “aggregate”-based reference used to designate the triggering event for 
surplus conditions in Article III(c).  After October 1, 1963, further equitable apportionment may 
be pursued under Article III(f) if “either Basin” approaches “its” full entitlement in Articles 
III(a) and (b).  The singular nature of this text unambiguously focuses on the individual 
entitlements of the sub-basins when defining the triggering event.  The text of Article III(c) 
contrasts sharply with this approach:  Surplus conditions are triggered when Colorado River 
System waters exist over and above “the aggregate of the quantities specified in [Articles III(a) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“waters of the Colorado River System not covered by the terms of this compact.”).  These provisions do not appear 
relevant in sorting out the relative merits of the Upper and Lower Basins’ positions on the surplus issue. 
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and (b)].”  (Emphasis added.)  This text is collective rather than singular in nature.  It references 
the entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins in the aggregate – not individually. 
 Article III(b) provides a second example of an entitlement-specific reference.  In 
supplementing the Lower Basin’s entitlement set forth in Article III(a), Article III(b) references 
that entitlement (and the Lower Basin) in the singular:  “In addition to the apportionment in 
paragraph (a), the Lower Basin is hereby given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive 
use of such waters by one million acre-feet per annum.”  (Emphasis added).   
 The implication of the entitlement-specific references in Articles III(b) and (f) is 
straightforward:  If the Commissioners had intended “surplus” to refer to water over and above 
that associated with the sub-basins’ individual entitlements, they would have drafted Article 
III(c) to resemble Articles III(b) and (f) in this respect.  Among other things, the Commissioners 
would have omitted “aggregate” from Article III(c) – e.g., “such waters shall be supplied first 
from the waters which are surplus over and above . . . the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) 
and (b).”  Initial drafts of Article III(c) contained phrases resembling this one (see below).  But 
“aggregate” unmistakably made its way into the final version of the Compact. 
 
Equity-Based Provisions 
 Faced with the contrary textual and contextual evidence described above, one potential 
source of support for the Upper Basin’s position consists of the myriad provisions within the 
Compact emphasizing equity as the norm around which the apportionment scheme is framed.
69
  
The Upper Basin’s potential argument foreseeably  might consist of two parts:  (1) The 
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  Carlson & Boles suggest the Upper Basin’s position might be viable based on the following rationale:  “[T]he 
underlying purpose of this argument does conform to the intent of the Compact Commissioners to equalize the 
Article III(a) apportionments provided to each Basin and furthermore to match the Upper Basin's Article III(d) 
delivery obligation to the amount of those apportionments.”  Carlson & Boles, supra note 59, at 21.05[2][a]. 
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Commissioners’ purpose in drafting the Compact was to effectuate an equitable apportionment 
of the waters of the Colorado River System, and (2) construing “surplus” in Article III(c) as 
referring to water used in excess of the sub-basins’ entitlements in Articles III(a) and (b) fulfills 
this purpose (at least presumably to a greater extent than does the Lower Basin’s interpretation). 
 The first part of this potential argument has ample support.  Article I expressly states:  
“The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment 
of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System . . . .”
70
  This purpose is echoed and 
manifest throughout the subsections of Article III:  Articles III(a) and (b) (apportioning almost 
equal entitlements of 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf to Upper and Lower Basins respectively); Article 
III(c) (requiring Upper and Lower Basins to equally bear the burden of contributing water to 
Mexico’s entitlement in deficiency conditions); Article III(d) (providing Upper Basin with 
flexibility in making annual deliveries to satisfy delivery obligation to Lower Basin of 75 maf 
every consecutive ten years);  Article III(e) (prohibiting Upper Division from withholding water, 
and Lower Division from requiring delivery of water, that “cannot reasonably be applied to 
domestic and agricultural uses”); Article III(f) (providing for further equitable apportionment of 
initially unapportioned Colorado River System waters); Article III(g) (defining duty of public 
officials engaged in further apportionment per Article III(f) as “to divide and apportion 
equitably” Colorado River System water between Upper and Lower Basins). 
 The second part of the potential argument, however, is more difficult to support.  Article 
III(c) – specifically, section one addressing surplus conditions – exists in the midst of the 
numerous equity-related provisions identified above and presumably mirrors (rather than 
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  Delph Carpenter, the Colorado Commissioner, described the purposes statement in Article I as a guide to the 
intent of the Commissioners with regard to the content of the Compact.  See Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting 
of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 167.  The colloquy in which Carpenter made this 
statement is quoted in the discussion of the tributaries issue. 
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contradicts) them.  Put differently, the definition of “surplus” supported by a straightforward 
reading of Article III’s text – Colorado River System waters “over and above the aggregate of 
the quantities specified in [Articles III(a) and (b)]” – is not inherently inequitable (i.e., not 
inherently at odds with the Compact’s overarching purpose of equitable apportionment).  To the 
contrary, the plain text of Article III(c) suggests that the Commissioners actually considered the 
definition of “surplus” set forth therein to be equitable, existing alongside the other subsections 
of Article III oriented toward equity.  The Upper Basin position (at least as characterized here) 
essentially (1) assumes the “aggregate”-based definition of “surplus” conflicts with the 
Commissioners’ intent to craft an equitable apportionment scheme and (2) calls for projecting an 
entitlement-specific definition of “surplus” onto Article III(c) despite the clear expression of the 




 Serving as an additional point of reference for determining the meaning of “surplus,” the 
Negotiation Minutes identify predecessors to the final version of Article III(c), and associated 
discussions among the Commissioners, spanning from the Eleventh to the Twenty-Fifth 
Meetings.  These antecedent provisions and related discussions can be categorized into three 
time periods based on the following events:  (1) Eleventh Meeting – introduction of a draft 
compact containing a provision mandating equal sharing of the burden of Mexico’s treaty 
entitlement by the Upper and Lower Divisions; (2) Twenty-Second Meeting – insertion of a 
clause addressing the use of “surplus” water to supply Mexico’s treaty entitlement in a 
subsequent draft of Article III(c); and (3) Twenty-Fourth Meeting – amendment of Article III(c) 
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to include “aggregate” in the clause addressing surplus water.  The evolution of Article III(c) 
over these three periods supports the inference that the inclusion of an “aggregate”-based 
definition of “surplus” in the final version of the Article was deliberate and purposeful – 
although the Commissioners did not engage in any smoking-gun exchanges about this issue. 
 The emergence of an Article addressing the obligations of the Upper and Lower Basins 
with regard to Mexico’s treaty entitlement can be attributed (at least in part) to Delph Carpenter, 
the Colorado Commissioner, who submitted a draft compact at the Eleventh Meeting containing 
a provision calling for equal sharing of this burden:   
  “[Article III:]  The High Contracting Parties agree that the duty and burden 
 of supplying any waters from the flow of the Colorado River within the United  
 States of America to the Republic of Mexico . . . shall be equally apportioned between 
 and equally borne by the Upper Division and the Lower Division of the Colorado 
 River within the United States of America; that the annual delivery at Lee’s Ferry, 
 by the States of the Upper Division, of a quantity of water equivalent to one-half the 
 annual amount required to satisfy any such international obligations shall be a 
 complete fulfillment of the provisions of this Article by said States; and that the 
 States of the Lower Division shall contribute annually a like amount of water from 
 those waters of the river annually to pass Lee’s Ferry for the Lower Division, as 
 provided in Paragraph two (2) of Article II of this compact, and from the flow of 
 tributaries entering the river below Lee’s Ferry, and further, shall cause the 
 water contributed by both divisions to be delivered to the Republic of Mexico 
 in conformity with any such treaty obligations.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 Between the Eleventh and Twenty-Second Meetings, subsequent draft provisions 
addressing the sub-basins’ respective obligations toward Mexico (and discussions among the 
Commissioners about this topic) reflected the make-up of Article III of Carpenter’s draft 
compact in two ways:  (1) they emphasized equal sharing of the Mexican treaty obligation, 
incorporating the phrase “equally apportioned between and equally borne by,” and (2) they did 
not address “surplus” water and its role as a source of supply for Mexico’s entitlement (e.g., in a 
clause separate from portions of the provisions calling for equal sharing).  Examples of draft 
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provisions introduced during this initial period include the following:
71
 
 Eighteenth Meeting:  “The burden, if any, of supplying water from the flow of the 





 Nineteenth Meeting: 
 
o “The contracting states agree that the burden of supplying water of the 
Colorado River System from the United States of America to the Republic of 
Mexico in fulfillment of obligations, if any, which may exist, or may be 
determined to exist between the two Nations, shall be equally apportioned 
between and equally borne by the Upper Division and Lower Division; and the 
States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry a quantity of water over 
and above that provided in Article III which will enable the fulfillment of one-




o “If in the adjustment of international relations, the Republic of Mexico shall 
hereafter establish any rights to waters from the Colorado River System, the 
burden of supplying such water shall be equally apportioned between and 
equally borne by the Upper Basin and Lower Basin; and the States of the Upper 
Basin shall deliver at Lee Ferry a quantity of water over and above that 
provided in Article III which will enable the fulfillment of one-half of the 




 Twentieth Meeting: 
o “The burden of supplying water of the Colorado River System from the United 
States of America to the United States of Mexico in fulfillment of obligations, 
if any, which may exist, or may be determined to exist, by the two governments 
shall be equally apportioned between and equally borne by the upper basin and 
lower basin and the states of the upper basin shall deliver at Lee Ferry a 
quantity of water over and above that provided in Art. IIIx, which will enable 
the fulfillment of one half of the amount required to satisfy such delivery.”
75
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  See also Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 14, 1922, at 83 
(discussing equal sharing of Mexican treaty burden); Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Colorado River 
Commission, November 15, 1922, at 112 (oral proposal by W.S. Norviel, Arizona Commissioner, calling for equal 
sharing of Mexican treaty burden). 
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  Id. at 49-50 (emphasis added). 
75
  Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 63-64 (emphasis 




o “The burden of supplying water of the Colorado River System from the United 
States of America to the United States of Mexico in fulfillment of obligations, 
if any, which may be established, shall be equally apportioned between and 




 While retaining the focus on equal sharing expressed in the “equally apportioned between 
and equally borne by” clauses of its predecessors, the draft of Article III(c) introduced at the 
Twenty-Second Meeting departed from those provisions by including a clause addressing 
“surplus” water and its role in supplying Mexico’s treaty entitlement for the first time. 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of the waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall first be supplied from the surplus 
 water after the above amounts have been satisfied; and if such surplus water shall 
 prove insufficient for this purpose, then the deficiency shall be equally apportioned 
 between and equally borne by the upper basin and the lower basin, and the states of 
 the upper division shall deliver at Lees Ferry one half of the deficiency so recognized 




The italicized text of this provision differs significantly from that in the final version of Article 
III(c).  The terms “above amounts” referenced the sub-basin entitlements in drafts of Articles 
III(a) and (b) – similar to the phrase “quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b)” in the final 
version of Article III(c) – but there is no analogue to the term “aggregate” in this draft provision.  
Based on its inclusion of “above amounts” (pluralized) and the omission of an analogue to 
“aggregate,” “surplus” as defined herein reasonably could be construed as referring to waters 
above the amounts associated with the individual sub-basin entitlements. 
 The draft of Article III(c) introduced at the Twenty-Second Meeting persisted in the form 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
53-70.  A provision similar to the one quoted here was introduced earlier in the meeting – see id. at 53-54 – and an 
almost identical version of it was set out as Article VII in a draft version of the Compact appended to the meeting 
minutes.  See id. at 94.   
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  Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
 
77
  Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 138 
(emphasis added).  
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above – containing a surplus water clause without an analogue to “aggregate” – through the 
Twenty-Third Meeting.  The Commissioners accepted a nearly identical version of the provision 
at that meeting with little discussion – only the following exchange between Herbert Hoover, the 
Federal Commissioner, and Frank C. Emerson, the Wyoming Commissioner: 
  “MR. EMERSON:  I suggest in paragraph (c), fifth line, we make ‘water’ plural. 




The use of “water” to which Emerson was referring appeared in the middle of the surplus water 
clause:  “such waters shall first be supplied from the surplus water after the above amounts have 
been satisfied[.]”
79
  Emerson’s reason for proposing changing this term from the singular to the 
plural is unclear – and certainly not alone dispositive of this issue.  One possibility, however, is 
that he understood the terms “surplus water” within this clause as referring to water over and 
above the amounts of the individual sub-basins’ entitlements set forth in drafts of Articles III(a) 
and (b) and that he considered the pluralized term “waters” to align with this meaning.  
 Ultimately, the term “aggregate” found its way into Article III(c) via an amendment to 
the existing draft of that provision made at the Twenty-Fourth Meeting: 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters 
 which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in 
 paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, 
 then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally apportioned between and equally 
 borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States 
 of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the  
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 187. 
 
79
  Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added). 
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 deficiency so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).”
80
 
This draft of Article III(c) is appended to the meeting minutes.  No discussion of the amendment 
among the Commissioners is identified in the minutes.  As the text reveals, the amendment 
entailed inserting the phrase “waters which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the 
quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b)” in place of the phrase “surplus water after the 
above amounts have been satisfied” in the previous draft.  The Commissioners subsequently 
made a minor amendment to Article III(c) at the Twenty-Fifth Meeting
81
 – not relevant here – 





 In conclusion, the balance of the textual, contextual, and historical material surveyed 
above favors the Lower Basin’s position on the surplus issue:  As used in Article III(c), “surplus” 
waters consist of waters in the Colorado River System over and above the 16.0 maf specified in 
Article III(a) and (b) in relation to the entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins.  The 
inclusion of the term “aggregate” in the final version of Article III(c) appears to provide virtually 
irrefutable evidence supporting this interpretation (and contravening the entitlement-specific 
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 23, 1922, at 255-56, 260. 
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 Question: Does the Upper Basin’s obligation to supply water for Mexico’s treaty 
entitlement during “deficiency” conditions
83
 under Article III(c) include coverage of one-half of 
the evaporation losses between Lee Ferry and the Mexican points of delivery?
84
   
 The Lower Basin asserts an affirmative answer to this question: 
 “[T]he Mexican Treaty obligation to be shared by the Upper Division States 
 should include not only one-half of the 1.5 MAF of mainstream Colorado River 
 water delivered to Mexico during [deficiency] years, but in addition, one-half of 
 the estimated 286,000 AF of losses that occur as the water moves through the 
 Lower Basin to the Mexican border delivery points.  The total Upper Division 
 share of the Mexican Treaty obligation should therefore be approximately 0.9 




 The Upper Basin contends the opposite: 
 “This issue was raised just twice during the compact negotiations.  The commissioners 
 discussed designating Yuma, Arizona, as the delivery point for water due Mexico. 
 Delph Carpenter, commissioner for the State of Colorado, commented that such a 
 designation would have the effect of imposing an additional burden on the Upper 
 Basin.  The notion of locating the delivery point at Yuma was subsequently  
 abandoned.  Article III(c) states that the Upper Basin “shall deliver at Lee Ferry 
 water to supply one-half of the deficiency.”  By specifically designating Lee’s Ferry 
 as the point of delivery, the 1922 Compact expressly relieves the Upper Basin of  




 As shown below, the Upper Basin’s position appears stronger on this issue, although the 
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  The meaning of “deficiency” and “surplus” conditions is discussed below in the textual analysis. 
 
84
  Useful scholarship identifying and discussing this issue includes Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Disappearing 
Colorado River 9 W. Econ. F. 1, 3 (2010); Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West:  The Colorado River Compact 
and the Politics of Water in the American West 204 n 77 (2d ed 2009); W. Patrick Schiffer et al., From a Colorado 
River Compact Challenge to the Next Era of Cooperation Among the Seven Basin States, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 217, 225 
(2007); John U. Carlson, The Colorado River Compact:  A Breeding Ground for International, National, and 
Interstate Controversies 20-21, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, June 5-7, 
1989; John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 21-1, 21.05[2][c] (1986); Edward W. 
Clyde, Institutional Response to Prolonged Drought, in New Courses for the Colorado River 112, 119 (1986); 
David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 422-23 (1985); Charles J. 
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 17, 24 (1966). 
 
85
  Schiffler et al., supra note 84, at 225. 
 
86
  Carlson, Breeding Ground, supra note 84, at 20-21 (emphasis in original).  
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analysis is not quite as clear cut as that for the tributaries and surplus issues – in large part 
because of the absence of comparable textual evidence (i.e., the inclusion of “Colorado River 
System” and “aggregate,” respectively, in Article III(c)).  On balance, however, the textual, 
contextual, and historical materials suggest the Upper Basin would likely prevail if this issue 
were presented to the Supreme Court.  The sections below provide preliminary examinations of 
these materials. 
 
Article III(c)’s Text 
 The text of Article III(c) states as follows: 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters 
 which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in  
 paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, 
 then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and 
 the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall 
 deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency recognized in 
 addition to that provided in paragraph (d).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 Evaporation losses are not addressed in this text – which, as noted, makes this issue 
different than the tributaries issue (“Colorado River System”) and the surplus issue (“aggregate”) 
at this stage of the analysis.  In the absence of an express reference to evaporation losses, at least 
three terms are relevant to this issue:  (1) “equally borne”; (2) “Lee Ferry”; and (3) “deficiency.” 
 The meaning of “equally borne” within Article III(c) is plain:  The Upper and Lower 
Basins are required to equally bear the burden of any “deficiency” associated with supplying 
water for Mexico’s treaty entitlement, and the Upper Division is obligated to deliver water at Lee 
Ferry to supply one-half of any such “deficiency.”  In short, these clauses establish an equal 
sharing relationship.  Left unanswered by them, however, is the meaning of the thing to be 
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equally shared – specifically, whether “deficiency” encompasses evaporation losses. 
 Some commentators consider this issue resolved based upon Article III(c)’s designation 
of “Lee Ferry” as the delivery point for the Upper Division’s share of Mexican treaty water in 
“deficiency” conditions.
87
  The obligations of the Upper Basin to provide this treaty water (and 
to cover evaporation losses thereof) cease at Lee Ferry on this view.  This rationale is persuasive, 
but it seems to require further examination of the term “deficiency.”  Does the term encompass 
evaporation losses?  That is, although Article III(c) designates “Lee Ferry” as the point where the 
Upper Division must deliver water to cover one-half of any “deficiency,” this designation itself 
does not address whether evaporation losses in the Lower Basin are subsumed within the thing 
for which a one-half contribution of water is required (i.e., the “deficiency”). 
 It would appear that the resolution of the evaporation issue hinges as much on the 
meaning of “deficiency” within Article III(c) as it does on the designation of “Lee Ferry” as the 
delivery point.  Again, does the former term account for evaporation losses in the Lower Basin as 
something that “shall be equally borne by” the sub-basins and that the Upper Division is 
obligated to deliver “water to supply one-half of” at Lee Ferry?  Answering this question – i.e., 
defining “deficiency” – initially requires considering the meaning of “surplus” in Article III(c):  
Colorado River System waters over and above the aggregate 16.0 maf apportioned to the Upper 
and Lower Basins in Articles III(a) and (b).
88
  This definition is inseparable from the definition 
of “deficiency.”  If insufficient “surplus” waters exist to supply Mexico’s treaty entitlement of 
1.5 maf in a given year, then “the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper 
Basin and the Lower Basin, and . . . the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply 
                                                          
87
  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 84, at 21 (“By specifically designating Lee’s Ferry as the point of delivery, the 
1922 Compact expressly relieves the Upper Basin of any duty to compensate for channel losses occurring below that 
point.”); Carlson & Boles, supra note 84, at 21.05[2][c] (same); Clyde, supra note 84, at 112, 119 (same).  
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  A full analysis of the definition of “surplus” can be found in the earlier discussion devoted to this issue. 
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one-half of the deficiency . . . .”  “Deficiency” thus refers to a shortfall:  the amount by which 
“surplus” waters fall short of supplying Mexico’s treaty entitlement.
89
 
 Having defined “deficiency” as the foregoing type of shortfall, a key consideration in 
resolving the evaporation issue is Article III(c)’s silence on evaporation losses in relation to the 
processes prescribed for determining surplus and deficiency conditions.  In determining the 
existence of “surplus” waters, Article III(c) calls for an assessment of the amount of water in the 
Colorado River System in a given year vis-à-vis the 16.0 maf apportioned to the Upper and 
Lower Basins collectively in Articles III(a) and (b).  In turn, in determining the existence of a 
“deficiency,” Article III(c) requires assessing the extent to which “surplus” waters exist to supply 
Mexico’s treaty entitlement.  Neither assessment accounts for evaporation losses.  Instead, both 
entail assessing the relevant amount of available water vis-à-vis the relevant entitlement(s). 
 Article III(c)’s silence in this respect thus suggests two things:  (1) the provision only 
requires equally sharing of the amount by which “surplus” waters fall short of supplying treaty 
water to Mexico (i.e., without consideration of evaporation losses in the Lower Basin (or Upper 
Basin)) and (2) the sub-basins must account for (“stomach”) evaporation losses on an individual 
basis when supplying the requisite amount of treaty water in “deficiency” conditions.  This 
interpretation comports with the Upper Basin’s position:  It is not obligated to cover one-half of 
the evaporation losses in the Lower Basin when a “deficiency” exists. 
 
 
                                                          
89
  The use of “shortfall” as a synonym for “deficiency” comports with definitions contained in dictionaries that 
existed (roughly) contemporaneously with the drafting of the Compact.  See, e.g., The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of 
Current English 211 (1925) (defining “deficiency: as “lack or shortage (of) . . . deficit”); Webster’s International 
Dictionary of the English Language 687 (2d ed. 1935) (defining “deficiency” as the “state or quality of being 
deficient; inadequacy; defect” and defining “deficient” as “[l]acking in some quality, characteristic, or the like, 
necessary for completeness; . . . not up to a given or normal standard; not sufficient; defective; lacking; . . . also, 




 Although Article III(c)’s text is fairly useful in resolving the evaporation issue, there is a 
dearth of relevant provisions in the surrounding context.  At the outset, it is notable that the 
Commissioners did not address evaporation losses anywhere in the Compact.  If they had done 
so, the contrasting absence of any express treatment of evaporation losses in Article III(c) would 
lend support to the Upper Basin’s position.  But no such distinction can be made.  Beyond this 
initial observation, at least two types of contextual provisions are worth noting relevant to this 
issue, although neither of them provides a definitive resolution to it. 
 The first type of provisions consists of those emphasizing the sub-basins as the primary 
political units around which the Compact’s apportionment scheme is framed.  The structure of 
the apportionment scheme in this respect bolsters the notion that each sub-basin should be 
obligated to account solely for its own portion of evaporation losses – i.e., out of its own 
entitlement – when supplying Mexican treaty water toward a “deficiency.”  Examples of relevant 
provisions in this vein include Article I (establishing sub-basin structure for apportionment 
scheme); Articles III(a) and (b) (apportioning sub-basins’ entitlements); Article III(d) (imposing 
delivery obligation on Upper Basin vis-à-vis Lower Basin); Article III(g) (providing for further 
equitable apportionment by sub-basins); and Article VIII (providing water rights to Colorado 
River System waters must be satisfied from entitlement of sub-basin in which rights are situate). 
 Although these provisions are worth noting in relation to the evaporation issue, their 
persuasive force is qualified for at least two reasons.  First, not all provisions comprising the 
Compact’s apportionment scheme emphasize the sub-basins as the relevant political units.  For 
example, Articles IV(a) and (b) establish use hierarchies for Colorado River System water 
(domestic, agricultural, power, navigation) that apply to the apportionment scheme on a 
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basinwide scale.  Second, it is questionable whether the predominantly sub-basin-based structure 
of the apportionment scheme adheres in the same manner to U.S.-Mexico relations (i.e., in the 
context of Article III(c)) as it does to domestic relations (i.e., in the context of Article III(a), (b), 
(d), (e), (g)).  As noted, the processes for determining the existence of “surplus” waters and any 
associated “deficiency” are basinwide in scope.  The former requires assessing if more than 16.0 
maf exists in the Colorado River System in a given year.  The latter involves assessing the extent 
to which surplus waters fall short of supplying Mexico’s treaty entitlement (albeit requiring 
equal contributions from the sub-basins based on this calculation).  In short, the United States 
and Mexico (federal sovereigns) arguably are the relevant political units within Article III(c). 
 A second group of contextual provisions worth considering in relation to the evaporation 
issue are those identifying equity as the core norm underlying the Compact’s apportionment 
scheme.  In drawing attention to these provisions, the notion is twofold:  (1) equity should inform 
any interpretation of ambiguous or omitted text in Article III(c) and (2) the Lower Basin’s 
construction of Article III(c) comports with equity more so than does the Upper Basin’s position.  
Notable equity-oriented provisions within the Compact include Article I (identifying equitable 
apportionment as purpose of Compact);
90
 Articles III(a) and (b) (allocating almost equal 
entitlements of 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf to Upper and Lower Basins respectively); Article III(c) 
(requiring Upper and Lower Basins to equally bear the burden of contributing Mexican treaty 
water in deficiency conditions); Article III(f) (providing for further equitable apportionment of 
initially unapportioned Colorado River System waters); Article III(g) (defining duty of public 
officials engaged in further apportionment per Article III(f) as “to divide and apportion 
                                                          
90
  Delph Carpenter, the Colorado Commissioner, described the purposes statement in Article I as a guide to the 
intent of the Commissioners with regard to the content of the Compact.  See Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting 
of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 167.  The colloquy in which Carpenter made this 
statement is quoted earlier in the tributaries issue discussion. 
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equitably” Colorado River System water between Upper and Lower Basins). 
 The main shortcoming with relying on these provisions to support the Lower Basin’s 
position essentially is that “equity” is in the eye of the beholder – i.e., it is questionable whether 
interpreting Article III(c) to require the Upper Basin to cover one-half of the Lower Basin 
evaporation losses indeed is “equitable.”  Average evaporation losses in the Lower Basin (1.235 
maf/yr.) are higher than those in the Upper Basin (0.56 maf/yr.).
91
  At the same time, however, 
the entitlement of the Lower Basin (8.5 maf/yr.) is 1.0 maf larger than that of the Upper Basin 
(7.5 maf/yr.).  Based on these numbers, if evaporation losses are covered in accordance with the 
Lower Basin’s position, the sub-basins’ respective contributions of treaty water will be (1) Upper 
Basin – 1.1175 maf/yr. (out of 7.5 maf entitlement) versus (2) Lower Basin – 0.6775 maf/yr. (out 
of 8.5 maf entitlement).  In contrast, if the Upper Basin’s position is adhered to, the respective 
contributions will be (1) Upper Basin – 0.56 maf/yr. (out of 7.5 maf entitlement) versus (2) 
Lower Basin – 1.235 maf/yr. (out of 8.5 maf entitlement).  There is no clear cut (non-subjective) 
answer regarding which of these two interpretations is more “equitable.”
92
 
 At the end of the day, although the contextual materials identified in this section 
potentially might have some bearing on the evaporation issue, they do not shed much (if any) 
additional light beyond that provided by Article III(c)’s text.  For further evidence of the 
Commissioners’ intent, the Negotiation Minutes need to be consulted, as they offer perhaps the 
clearest indication of the intended meaning of Article III(c) in this regard. 
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  The annual average evaporation losses included here are drawn from a spreadsheet produced by Carly Jerla from 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
 
92
  Perhaps the most “equitable” interpretation of Article III(c) would be to require the sub-basins to cover equal 
portions of evaporation losses as calculated on a basinwide scale (i.e., similar to the assessment of “surplus”).  The 
sub-basins’ respective contributions toward treaty water under this interpretation would be (1) Upper Basin – 0.8975 




 An ideal starting point for examining the Negotiation Minutes with respect to the 
evaporation issue is the submission of a draft Compact by Delph Carpenter, the Colorado 
Commissioner, at the Eleventh Meeting.  Between this event and the adoption of the final 
version of Article III(c) at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, the Commissioners engaged in at least 
four key exchanges concerning the evaporation issue, and the text of Article III(c) evolved in at 
least one significant way.  Each of these events lends support to the Upper Basin’s position – 
albeit in varying degrees.  This section tracks these events chronologically. 
 The draft Compact proposed by Carpenter at the Eleventh Meeting laid the foundation for 
the final version of the Compact in multiple respects.  As relevant here, the draft contained an 
Article III that closely resembled the final version of Article III(c): 
  “[Article III:]  The High Contracting Parties agree that the duty and burden 
 of supplying any waters from the flow of the Colorado River within the United  
 States of America to the Republic of Mexico . . . shall be equally apportioned between 
 and equally borne by the Upper Division and the Lower Division of the Colorado 
 River within the United States of America; that the annual delivery at Lee’s Ferry, 
 by the States of the Upper Division, of a quantity of water equivalent to one-half the 
 annual amount required to satisfy any such international obligations shall be a 
 complete fulfillment of the provisions of this Article by said States; and that the 
 States of the Lower Division shall contribute annually a like amount of water from 
 those waters of the river annually to pass Lee’s Ferry for the Lower Division, as 
 provided in Paragraph two (2) of Article II of this compact, and from the flow of 
 tributaries entering the river below Lee’s Ferry, and further, shall cause the 
 water contributed by both divisions to be delivered to the Republic of Mexico 
 in conformity with any such treaty obligations.”
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 This provision clearly lacked the terms “surplus” and “deficiency” – and the 
corresponding assessments associated with those terms – set forth in the final version of Article 
III(c).  Nonetheless, reflecting that provision, this draft of Article III (1) called for equal sharing 
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  Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 11, 1922, at 24 (emphasis 
added).  All citations to the Minutes of the Negotiations refer to the pagination of the electronic copy of the Minutes 
available at http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/MinutesColoradoRiverCompact.pdf. 
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between the Upper and Lower Divisions vis-à-vis Mexico’s entitlement; (2) designated “Lee’s 
Ferry” as the delivery point for the Upper Division’s one-half contribution of this water; and (3) 
provided that the Upper Division’s delivery of the water at Lee’s Ferry “shall be a complete 
fulfillment of the provisions of this Article by said States.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 Shortly after Carpenter’s submission of his draft Compact, the evaporation issue was 
vetted at length during the Twelfth Meeting in relation to the draft’s Article III.  Two notable 
exchanges occurred during this meeting.  An initial exchange took place between Carpenter and 
W.S. Norviel, the Arizona Commissioner, which left little doubt that the draft Article did not 
obligate the Upper Basin to contribute to evaporation losses in the Lower Basin. 
    “MR. NORVIEL:  In the proposal that one-half the allotment to Mexico is to 
 be delivered at Lee’s Ferry, is any estimate to be made of the loss by evaporation or 
 percolation between Lee’s Ferry and the point of diversion to Mexico? 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  No.  That was considered.  It was thought that the power 
 benefits and other benefits that would run to the lower country would offset the losses. 
 That power benefits would run to the lower territory, as the water flows along it would 
 furnish an additional amount of energy that would be availed of by the lower country 
 for their development.  It was thought that that would offset evaporation losses.  Let me 
 make a further statement:  If within the Upper territory, say in Colorado, a reservoir is 
 constructed, we will have an average evaporation loss – or if a reservoir was constructed 
 at Flaming Gorge, we will have an evaporation loss.  We will have to stand that, and it 
 was thought the power benefits would offset the evaporation loss. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  I am referring to the half of the water you are to deliver to 
 Mexico. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  It was thought that all the evaporation losses along the 
 river in such division would be offset by the power benefits, and the Mexican water 
 with it. . . .  
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Well, that is argument, but the question was, is there to be 
 an estimate made of the evaporation losses between Lee’s Ferry and the point of 
 diversion. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  Yes sir, that was thought of, considered and discussed 
 by myself and Mr. Meeker to considerable length.  And as I stated at first, it was 
 thought the power benefits in that additional amount of water would more than offset 
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 the evaporation loss. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  That would perhaps bring another thought in that connection. 
 It is your intention then, that whatever the evaporation loss and loss by percolation of  
 the one-half you propose to deliver to Mexico, shall be made up from the water you 
 turn down in the amount that you have specified or propose to specify. 
  
  “MR. CARPENTER:  It would presumably.”
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Later in the meeting, a second (and equally clear) exchange occurred involving Carpenter, 
Norviel, and A.P. Davis, Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service. 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  It being necessary to construct a large dam in the lower river 
 to take care of the floods to be delivered to the lower basin as its portion of the waters 
 of the Colorado River, and on occasion perhaps of one, two or three years when no 
 water of consequence may be added, what effect would evaporation have on the quantity 
 of water for use in the reclamation of lands below? 
 
  “MR. A.P. DAVIS:  It would reduce it and under the compact as proposed by 
 Mr. Carpenter, it would be charged against the lower basin as I understand it. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Could you estimate the amount of that loss by evaporation? 
 
  “MR. A.P. DAVIS:  Yes, it can be estimated and I can give it to you in a few 
 minutes, very roughly.  I have a table here of the area of the reservoirs that might be 
 used either at Boulder Canyon or at Glen Canyon.  They would not have any very 
 different results.  I think I might take Boulder Canyon as a type and with, say,  
 16,000,000 acre feet which would be a necessary storage to entirely control the river 
 outside of any flood control considerations, that would expose to evaporation, an 
 area of 80,000 acres. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  And the evaporation per annum would be how many acre 
 feet? 
 
  “MR. A.P. DAVIS:  I suppose we might assume about six feet. . . .  Assuming 
 about one-half of it would be exposed, that would be about 240,000 acre feet per annum. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  With respect to any reservoirs constructed in the Upper  
 area, there would be evaporation there also, and that would automatically be cared for 
 and deducted under this plan without any figuring. 
 
  “MR. A.P. DAVIS:  That is true.  This compact requires, however, that the lower 
 basin stand the loss from either Lee’s Ferry, or anything below it.”
95
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  Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 12, 1922, at 79-80. 
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 Notwithstanding the clarity of the exchanges above regarding the evaporation issue, it 
certainly was not laid to rest at the Twelfth Meeting, emerging next at the Sixteenth Meeting in a 
fairly heated exchange involving Carpenter, Norviel, A.P. Davis, and Herbert Hoover, the 
Federal Commissioner.  This exchange occurred in the context of a discussion about the scope of 
the Lower Basin’s entitlement (8.2 maf per year proposed) and the associated scope of the Upper 
Basin’s delivery obligation to the Lower Basin (82 maf per consecutive ten-year period 
proposed).  Similar to the earlier exchanges, the upshot appears to have been that the Upper 
Basin was not obligated to supply treaty water to cover Lower Basin evaporation losses – 
although Norviel resisted this arrangement and avoided expressly confirming it. 
  “MR. HOOVER:  That’s the total they agree to deliver in ten year blocks.  Then, 
 just to further the discussion, if the Mexican deduction is to be borne by both sides and 
 we take the maximum Mexican position, it would mean so far as the southern basin is 
 concerned, their needs, as worked out by the Reclamation Service including the projects 
 in view, are 7,450,000 feet, so that 8,200,000 covers that with a comfortable margin. 
 
  “MR. A.P. DAVIS:  It includes half the water to be delivered to Mexico on the 
 basis of 800,000 acres. 
 
  “MR. HOOVER:  So the southern basin would be protected as to their end and 
 still have a margin of about 800,000 acre feet. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  That would be for possible future development. 
 
  “MR. HOOVER:  Or anything that may happen to you. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Delivered at the point of delivery. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  Delivered at Lee’s Ferry; you already have figured your 
 evaporation on the river. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Not this one.  We figured that for the purpose of calculation. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  You told us that power was many times more valuable 
 than any other use.  We are letting you tear all the fire out of that water clear down 
 to Laguna. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
95
  Id. at 87-88. 
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  “MR. NORVIEL:  You have more miles above and the fire will already have 
 been torn out. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  It recovers itself, it’s just as good; our evaporation is 
 already taken out. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  The evaporation is not taken out of the two million if it is 
 to be delivered to us. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  If we use it for power above, our evaporation is 
 already out. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  The evaporation has not been deducted from the million 
 and a half acre feet that you are going to deliver to Mexico.  You have to make 
 delivery at the point of delivery, not 600 miles above. 
 
  “MR. HOOVER:  Mr. Norviel, you have a margin of 750,000 feet to take care 
 of all needs all along.  That’s pretty liberal. 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  That makes 8,200,000 acre feet a year minimum. 
 
  “MR. HOOVER:  That’s the total to be delivered at Lee’s Ferry.”
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 Although Norviel avoided expressly confirming the Lower Basin’s obligation to fully 
cover its evaporation losses in the exchange above, he later did so at the Seventeenth Meeting – 
specifically, in a subsequent discussion about the terms proposed for the Lower Basin’s 
entitlement and the Upper Basin’s delivery obligation to the Lower Basin noted above.  
Norviel’s statement came in response to a question from Stephen B. Davis, the New Mexico 
Commissioner, regarding the latter term (a “fair” delivery guarantee for the Lower Basin).  Also 
marginally involved in the exchange was James G. Scrugham, the Nevada Commissioner. 
  “MR. S.B. DAVIS:  Mr. Norviel, in order that we may know how far apart 
 we are in this matter, would you state what you do consider a fair amount to be  
 guaranteed to you at Lee’s Ferry? 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  I think, inasmuch as our needs are practically even, we 
 will accept the burden of the losses below Lee’s Ferry, and take a reconstructed river 
 on an even basis at Lee’s Ferry. 
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  Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 14, 1922, at 83-84.  This 
exchange is discussed in Carlson & Boles, supra note 84, at 21.05[2][c]. 
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  “MR. S.B. DAVIS:  Will you state that in acre feet? 
 
  “MR. NORVIEL:  Tell me what the acre feet are and I will. 
 
  “MR. S.B. DAVIS:  You know, I don’t know. 
 
  “MR. SCRUGHAM:  It would be between eight and nine million a year. 
 
  “MR. S.B. DAVIS:  Let us have it specifically. 
   
  “MR. NORVIEL:  I will go back to the proposition made to us yesterday. 
 we will accept eight million two hundred thousand acre feet, on a ten year basis 
 with a four and a half million minimum, while on a five year basis a four million 
 minimum annual flow will be acceptable.”
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 The Commissioners bickered at length over the terms above – i.e., the make-up of an 
“equitable” apportionment scheme – throughout the remainder of the Negotiations.  Focusing on 
the prospect of designating Yuma as the delivery point for the Upper Basin’s treaty water, a final 
exchange relevant to the evaporation issue occurred at the Twentieth Meeting.  In a nutshell, 
Carpenter initially introduced the idea of designating Yuma as the delivery point, the 
Commissioners briefly discussed doing so, and the idea ultimately was abandoned.
98
  Most 
notable within the exchange is a statement made by Carpenter about the impact of relocating the 
delivery point to Yuma on the Upper Basin’s liability for Lower Basin evaporation losses. 
  “MR CARPENTER:  Let me give you an idea to pick at, -- it came into my 
 range of thought and is probably worthless.  Suppose it would be stipulated in this 
 compact that the burden of supplying all water that was necessary to pass Yuma for 
 diversion below shall be equally borne by the two divisions, -- yes, I realize that the 
 Imperial Valley is in that division. 
 
  “MR. MC CLURE:  I think we might accept that, -- all water to be divided 
 below Yuma to be equally divided between the two divisions. 
 
  * * * * * 
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  This exchange is discussed in Carlson & Boles, supra note 84, at 21.05[2][c].  
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  “MR. CARPENTER:  I was thinking of the All-American canal when I made 
 the suggestion.  The All-American canal will now be above Yuma.  Of course, at 
 present the amount passing Yuma would have the effect of imposing an additional 
 burden at once at Lee Ferry that in our minds we had already cared for at the point, 
 which would not be satisfactory I know to, -- 
 
  “MR. HOOVER:  That would be putting on the upper states half of the burden. 
 
  “MR. CARPENTER:  Which we feel have already provided for.” 
 
 Revealing exchanges like those quoted above do not appear in subsequent portions of the 
Negotiation Minutes.  However, the Minutes do track the evolution of Article III(c) from the 
draft of Article III introduced by Delph Carpenter at the Eleventh Meeting to the final edit made 
on the provision at the Twenty-Fifth Meeting.  Three drafts of Article III(c) introduced at the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Meetings are worth noting relevant to the evaporation issue: 
 Nineteenth Meeting: 
 
o “The contracting states agree that the burden of supplying water of the 
Colorado River System from the United States of America to the Republic of 
Mexico in fulfillment of obligations, if any, which may exist, or may be 
determined to exist between the two Nations, shall be equally apportioned 
between and equally borne by the Upper Division and Lower Division; and 
the States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry a quantity of water 
over and above that provided in Article III which will enable the fulfillment of 




o “If in the adjustment of international relations, the Republic of Mexico shall 
hereafter establish any rights to waters from the Colorado River System, the 
burden of supplying such water shall be equally apportioned between and 
equally borne by the Upper Basin and Lower Basin; and the States of the 
Upper Basin shall deliver at Lee Ferry a quantity of water over and above that 
provided in Article III which will enable the fulfillment of one-half of the 




 Twentieth Meeting:  “The burden of supplying water of the Colorado River System 
from the United States of America to the United States of Mexico in fulfillment of 
obligations, if any, which may exist, or may be determined to exist, by the two 
                                                          
99




  Id. at 49-50 (emphasis added). 
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governments shall be equally apportioned between and equally borne by the upper 
basin and lower basin and the states of the upper basin shall deliver at Lee Ferry a 
quantity of water over and above that provided in Art. IIIx, which will enable the 




 The italicized clauses in these drafts of Article III(c) suggest a potentially different 
approach to the sub-basins’ contributions to Mexico’s treaty entitlement than that supported by 
the text of the final version of Article III(c).  Common features among these draft provisions and 
the final version of Article III(c) are (1) the call for equal sharing of the Mexican treaty burden 
between the sub-basins (or “Divisions”) and (2) the designation of Lee Ferry as the delivery 
point for the Upper Basin’s (or “Division’s”) one-half contribution of treaty water.  A salient 
distinction, however, is the draft provisions’ requirement that the Upper Basin’s contribution 
consist of a quantity of water that will “enable the fulfillment” of one-half of the amount required 
to satisfy Mexico’s treaty entitlement.  This text reasonably might be construed as supporting the 
Lower Basin’s position:  “Enabl[ing] the fulfillment” mandated delivery of a quantity of water 
that covered one-half of Mexico’s treaty entitlement plus carriage water required to offset 
evaporation losses between Lee Ferry and the Mexican points of delivery. 
 The potential support provided to the Lower Basin’s position by the “enable the 
fulfillment” clause went by the wayside with the introduction of a new draft of Article III(c) at 
the Twenty-Second Meeting.  This new draft included the terms “surplus” and “deficiency” for 
the first time and called for assessments related to those terms that closely resemble the 
corresponding assessments contained in the final version of Article III(c).    
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of the waters 
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  Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 63-64 (emphasis 
added).  The Commissioners discussed the Mexican treaty obligation at length throughout this meeting.  See id. at 
53-70.  A provision similar to the one quoted here was introduced earlier in the meeting – see id. at 53-54 – and an 
almost identical version of it was set out as Article VII in a draft version of the Compact appended to the meeting 
minutes.  See id. at 94. 
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 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall first be supplied from the surplus 
 water after the above amounts have been satisfied; and if such surplus water shall 
 prove insufficient for this purpose, then the deficiency shall be equally apportioned 
 between and equally borne by the upper basin and the lower basin, and the states of 
 the upper division shall deliver at Lees Ferry one half of the deficiency so recognized 




All told, while undoubtedly involving a degree of speculation, it is possible that the deletion of 
the “enable the fulfillment” clause from the preceding drafts of Article III(c) stemmed from 
concerns about that clause being construed in accordance with the Lower Basin’s position. 
 Bringing this survey of the Negotiation Minutes to a close, the Commissioners amended 
the draft of Article III(c) introduced at the Twenty-Second Meeting during the Twenty-Fourth 
and Twenty-Fifth Meetings.
103
  Neither amendment implicated the evaporation issue.  The 





 Virtually all of the materials covered above seem to favor the Upper Basin’s position on 
the evaporation issue.  Textual support in Article III(c) comes from its designation of “Lee 
Ferry” as the delivery point for the Upper Basin’s share of treaty water and its non-inclusion of 
evaporation losses in the processes for determining “surplus” and “deficiency” conditions.  The 
contextual evidence is wishy-washy.  It is questionable whether either sub-basin could gain any 
real traction by relying on the provisions emphasizing the generally sub-basin-based structure of 
the apportionment scheme or those illustrating equity as the core norm underlying that scheme.  
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 138 
(emphasis added).  
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 23, 1922, at 239; Minutes 
of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 23, 1922, at 255-56, 260.  The former 
amendment involved integrating the term “aggregate” into Article III(c) relevant to the surplus issue.  See earlier 
discussion of the surplus issue provides a discussion of the significance of this amendment.  
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 24, 1922, at 305. 
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Perhaps most probative are the exchanges among the Commissioners on this issue, and (to a 
lesser extent) the deletion of the “enable the fulfillment” clause in drafts of Article III(c), tracked 
in the Negotiation Minutes.  Overall, the Lower Basin appears to have little to hang its hat on in 
this realm – an equity-based argument foreseeably would not go very far.   
 
Delivery Issue 
 Turning now to the delivery issue, David Getches succinctly summarized the nature of 
this issue in his seminal article, Competing Demands for the Colorado River: 
  “A second question is whether the Mexican Treaty obligation requires annual 
 deliveries from the Upper Basin.  The Compact requires an aggregate ten-year flow 
 at Lee Ferry, . . .  But the Treaty promises Mexico an annual delivery.  In years when 
 more than 7,500,000 acre-feet are delivered at Lee Ferry, the Upper Basin gets credit 
 toward its ten-year, 75,000,000 acre-feet delivery requirement.  But does the Upper 
 Basin get credit toward future Mexican obligations for excess deliveries at Lee Ferry 
 if the water could physically be stored in the Lower Basin or was actually consumed 




 This summary of the issue highlights the contrary positions of the Upper and Lower 
Basins.
106
  The Lower Basin contends Article III(c) requires annual deliveries of Mexican treaty 
water and therefore the Upper Basin cannot receive credit in a given year for deliveries 
exceeding the obligatory one-half contribution made in prior years.  In short, Article III(c) does 
not permit carryover credit for treaty water.  The Upper Basin asserts to the contrary:  Article 
III(c) allows for carryover credit if the excess water delivered by the Upper Basin in a given year 
can be stored and used by the Lower Basin to supply Mexico’s treaty entitlement. 
 The vast majority of textual, contextual, and historical evidence surveyed below supports 
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  Getches, supra note 84, at 422. 
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  In addition to Getches’s seminal piece, useful scholarship identifying and/or discussing the delivery issue 




the Lower Basin’s position on this issue.  Considerations of equity at the contextual stage of the 
analysis, however, bolster the Upper Basin’s position to a limited extent.  On balance, it seems 
likely the Supreme Court would hold in favor of the Lower Basin if the issue were presented. 
 
Article III(c)’s Text 
 Article III(c) seems to expressly (yet indirectly) require annual deliveries of treaty water: 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters 
 which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in  
 paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, 
 then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and 
 the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall 
 deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency recognized in 
 addition to that provided in paragraph (d).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 The key to discerning the apparently annual nature of the sub-basins’ treaty water 
obligations in Article III(c) is the reference to Articles III(a) and (b).  These provisions allocate 
annual entitlements to the Upper and Lower Basins.  Article III(a) entitles each of the sub-basins 
to “the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum” from 
the Colorado River System.  And Article III(b) authorizes the Lower Basin “to increase its 
beneficial consumptive use of [Colorado River System water] by one-million acre-feet per 
annum.”   
 Article III(c) relies on the annual entitlements in Articles III(a) and (b) as the basis for 
assessing the existence of “surplus” or “deficiency” conditions – and, in turn, the scope of the 
sub-basins’ respective delivery obligations to Mexico – in any given year.  “Surplus” conditions 
exist if there is water in the Colorado River System beyond the 16.0 maf apportioned annually to 
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the Upper and Lower Basins by Articles III(a) and (b).
107
  The sub-basins must use this surplus 
water (if any) as the first source of supply for Mexico’s treaty entitlement.  A “deficiency” exists 
if this surplus water falls short of satisfying the treaty entitlement.  In this condition, the sub-
basins must equally bear the burden of supplying treaty water toward the deficiency. 
 Thus the gist of Article III(c)’s text with regard to the delivery issue is twofold:  (1) the 
scope of the sub-basins’ respective delivery obligations to Mexico is determined annually based 
upon the existence of surplus or deficiency conditions and (2) the process by which these annual 
determinations are made does not entail consideration of past deliveries of treaty water that 
exceeded the amount required by Article III(c) for the relevant year (e.g., .75 maf if no surplus 
water existed).  In short, Article III(c)’s text contains no indication that the Upper Basin is 
entitled to receive carryover credit for past deliveries of excess treaty water.  
 
Contextual Provisions 
 Two provisions within the context surrounding Article III(c) – specifically, one adjacent 
provision (Article III(d)) and one broad category of provisions (equity-related provisions) – shed 
additional light on the delivery issue.
108
  Article III(d) dovetails with the textual analysis above 
and supports the Lower Basin’s position.  In contrast, the equity-related provisions arguably 
provide the strongest (albeit limited) support for the Upper Basin’s position. 
 Article III(d) evidences the ability of the Commissioners to provide for the Upper Basin’s 
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 Article III(e) also potentially bears on the delivery issue, prohibiting the Upper Basin from withholding the 
delivery of Colorado River System water into the Lower Basin when such water “cannot reasonably be applied to 
domestic and agricultural uses.”  An unresolved  question  appears to exist regarding whether deliveries of this 
Article III(e) water can be counted toward the Upper Basin’s delivery obligations to Mexico under Article III(c).  
Are Article III(e) waters a distinct class of waters such that they cannot simultaneously constitute “surplus” waters 
or waters contributed toward a “deficiency” under Article III(c)?  If so, then no Article III(c)-related carryover 




receiving credit in a given year for obligatory deliveries of water made in prior years.  The 
provision prohibits the Upper Basin from causing the flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry 
from being “depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten 
consecutive years reckoned in progressive series.”  Construing this text as imposing a delivery 
requirement (i.e., rather than a duty not to deplete), this provision allows for fluctuating annual 
deliveries from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, so long as an aggregate of 75 maf passes 
Lee Ferry every successive ten-year period.  Article III(d)’s delivery obligation is decadal in 
nature.  Deliveries in excess of its corresponding annualized amount (7.5 maf) in a given year 
count toward deliveries made in prior and subsequent years within the same decade. 
 Although Article III(d) demonstrates their capacity to do so, the Commissioners clearly 
did not provide for a decadal delivery obligation in Article III(c) by which the scope of the sub-
basins’ annual delivery obligations to Mexico would be permitted to fluctuate according to past 
delivery amounts.  Instead, as discussed above, Article III(c) prescribes a process for determining 
the scope of the sub-basins’ annual delivery obligations that does not entail considering past 
deliveries.   Awarding carryover credit to the Upper Basin for excess deliveries does not comport 
with the Commissioners’ intent as manifest in the distinct terms of Articles III(c) and (d). 
 Yet “it only seems fair to credit the Upper Basin for excess deliveries which the Lower 
Basin can store and use to supply Mexico.”
109
  Charles Meyers identified this equity-based 
interpretation of Article III(c) in his landmark article, The Colorado River.  As noted above in 
the contextual analysis of the evaporation issue, “equity” is the norm around which the 
Compact’s apportionment scheme is framed, and a host of provisions illustrate this point.
110
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Building on this foundation, if the Lower Basin is capable of storing and using excess water 
delivered by the Upper Basin for Mexico in a given year, then it seems fair to credit such excess 
deliveries toward the Upper Basin’s Article III(c) delivery obligations in subsequent years.   
 Perhaps the Supreme Court might find this equity-based interpretation compelling if the 
issue were presented to it.  The rub is that it runs contrary to Article III(c)’s plain text (and the 
distinct but illuminating text of Article III(d)).  Meyers conceded this point after making the 
statement quoted above:  “[A]rticle III(c) seems to define surplus and deficiency by reference to 
[A]rticles III(a) and (b), in which the water accounting is on an annual basis.”
111
  The case for an 
equity-based interpretation of Article III(c) would be stronger if only the text were ambiguous. 
 
Negotiation Minutes 
 At least two types of events tracked in the Negotiation Minutes are potentially relevant to 
the evaporation issue (and other Article III(c) issues):  (1) exchanges among the Commissioners 
concerning the issue and (2) significant steps in the evolution (drafting history) of Article III(c) 
bearing on the issue.   We have not come across any exchanges among the Commissioners 
similar to those noted above for the evaporation issue – i.e., exchanges expressly addressing 
whether Article III(c) (or a predecessor thereof) permits the Upper Basin to receive carryover 
credit toward its Mexican delivery obligation for past deliveries of excess treaty water.  The 
drafting history of Article III(c) has proven slightly more helpful.  It does not document the 
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  See, e.g., Article I (identifying equitable apportionment as purpose of Compact); Articles III(a) and (b) 
(allocating almost equal entitlements of 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf to Upper and Lower Basins respectively); Article III(c) 
(requiring Upper and Lower Basins to equally bear the burden of contributing water to Mexico’s entitlement in 
deficiency conditions); Article III(f) (providing for further equitable apportionment of initially unapportioned 
Colorado River System waters); Article III(g) (defining duty of public officials engaged in further apportionment per 




  Meyers, supra note 84, at 25.  
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deletion of any draft clause within Article III(c) that would have authorized the Upper Basin to 
receive carryover credit for excess deliveries.  But it does reveal how the predecessors of Article 
III(c) – like the final version – consistently required annual deliveries of Mexican treaty water. 
 The annual nature of the Upper Basin’s delivery obligation under Article III(c) can be 
traced (yet again) to the draft Compact introduced by Delph Carpenter, the Colorado 
Commissioner, at the Eleventh Meeting.  Article III of this draft Compact plainly mandated 
annual deliveries to Mexico from the sub-basins (“Divisions”). 
  “[Article III:]  The High Contracting Parties agree that the duty and burden 
 of supplying any waters from the flow of the Colorado River within the United  
 States of America to the Republic of Mexico . . . shall be equally apportioned between 
 and equally borne by the Upper Division and the Lower Division of the Colorado 
 River within the United States of America; that the annual delivery at Lee’s Ferry, 
 by the States of the Upper Division, of a quantity of water equivalent to one-half the 
 annual amount required to satisfy any such international obligations shall be a 
 complete fulfillment of the provisions of this Article by said States; and that the 
 States of the Lower Division shall contribute annually a like amount of water from 
 those waters of the river annually to pass Lee’s Ferry for the Lower Division, as 
 provided in Paragraph two (2) of Article II of this compact, and from the flow of 
 tributaries entering the river below Lee’s Ferry, and further, shall cause the 
 water contributed by both divisions to be delivered to the Republic of Mexico 
 in conformity with any such treaty obligations.”
112
 
 After Carpenter’s submission of his draft Compact at the Eleventh Meeting, several draft 
provisions were introduced at the Nineteenth and Twentieth Meetings that resembled the initial 
draft of Article III in their requiring annual deliveries from the Upper Basin (or “Division”) to 
satisfy Mexico’s entitlement.  The annual nature of these obligations was reflected in a clause 
common to each of these draft provisions:  “The States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee 
Ferry a quantity of water over and above that provided in Article III which will enable the 
fulfillment of one-half of the amount required to satisfy such delivery.”
113
  “Such delivery” 
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referred to the sub-basins’ (or “Divisions’”) delivery obligations to Mexico.  “Article III” 
referred to an evolving draft of that Article that – contrasting the final version of Article III(d) – 
required the Upper Basin to annually deliver a prescribed amount of water to the Lower Basin.  
In short, the clause’s incorporation of the annual delivery obligation in the draft of Article III 
suggests that the Upper Basin’s delivery obligation to Mexico likewise was an annual one.
114
 
 The next relevant event occurred at the Twenty-Second Meeting with the introduction of 
the first draft of Article III(c) setting forth the terms “surplus” and “deficiency” and the related 
process for determining the sub-basins’ annual delivery obligations to Mexico. 
  “If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall 
 hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of the waters 
 of the Colorado River System, such waters shall first be supplied from the surplus 
 water after the above amounts have been satisfied; and if such surplus water shall 
 prove insufficient for this purpose, then the deficiency shall be equally apportioned 
 between and equally borne by the upper basin and the lower basin, and the states of 
 the upper division shall deliver at Lees Ferry one half of the deficiency so recognized 




The “surplus” water clause contained in this provision was distinct from its final version, 
omitting the term “aggregate” and an express reference to Articles III(a) and (b) – i.e., “such 
waters shall first be supplied from the surplus water after the above amounts have been 
satisfied.”  Nonetheless, the “above amounts” incorporated into this clause were the annual 
entitlements of the Upper and Lower Basins – 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf, respectively – specified in 
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  Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 39.  See also id. 
at 49-50 (identifying draft provision containing almost identical clause); Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the 
Colorado River Commission, November 19, 1922, at 63-64 (same). 
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in addition to Upper Basin’s annual delivery obligation to Lower Basin under referenced draft of Article III).  
Notably, the Commissioners also discussed the Upper Basin’s decadal delivery obligation to the Lower Basin under 
the evolving draft of Article III.  However,  we believe the reference to Article III in the draft provisions (quoted 
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  Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Colorado River Commission, November 22, 1922, at 138 
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drafts of Articles III(a) and (b).
116
  Mirroring the final version of Article III(c), therefore, this 
provision (1) relied on the sub-basins’ entitlements to determine the existence of surplus or 
deficiency conditions on an annual basis; (2) hinged the scope of the sub-basins’ annual delivery 
obligations to Mexico on the existence of surplus or deficiency conditions; and (3) omitted any 
mention of carryover credits for past deliveries of excess treaty water as a factor in the foregoing 
process for determining the scope of the sub-basins’ annual delivery obligations.  
  Little is left to tell about the Negotiations in relation to the delivery issue after the 
Twenty-Second Meeting.  The draft of Article III(c) introduced at that Meeting was amended at 
the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Meetings
117
 – neither amendment is relevant here – and the 





 As noted by Meyers, a glimmer of hope exists for the Upper Basin on this issue 
stemming from the equity-based interpretation of Article III(c).  On balance, however, this 
glimmer likely would be snuffed out by the materials favoring the Lower Basin’s position, 
particularly the plain text of Article III(c) and the enlightening, distinct text of Article III(d).  The 
latter provision shows the Commissioners were capable of crafting a delivery requirement that 
allows for fluctuating annual deliveries based on past delivery amounts.  Article III(c)’s text 
outlines a much different approach – one that entails annual deliveries being calculated based 
solely on annual conditions.  The drafting history of Article III(c) sheds some light on the 
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evolution of this approach.  Again, though, Articles III(c) and (d)  alone  may be dispositive. 
 
